



***Using Organizational Behavior
To Increase the Efficiency of
The Total Force Enterprise***

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The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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Abstract

The effects of good leadership on an organization are exponential. Unfortunately, so are the effects of bad leadership. The fields of Organizational Behavior, and its subset of Change Management, provide leaders with information that explains how and why individuals act and interact the way they do. Through a combination of social psychology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science, researchers can predict behaviors and offer solutions to leaders dealing with problems within their organizations. Understanding the effects of human behaviors on an organization gives leaders greater ability to steer their organizations towards success. The field of Change Management takes the principles of Organizational Behavior a step further and helps change agents move organizations through transformations by easing negative behaviors and reinforcing positive ones. Change Management also helps leaders and change agents organize their transformation around principles that provide focus for the organization and its members. Overall, the use of Organizational Behavior methods and Change Management practices increases the chance of success for transformations and increases efficiency by reducing chaos.

The Air Force is in the process of making major transformations through Classic, Active, and Air Reserve Component (ARC) associations. Depending on the type of association taking place, Active Duty, Reserve, and Air National Guard Units host other component units in an attempt to increase efficiencies in manpower, resources, equipment, and capabilities. Utilizing the knowledge and skills associated with the fields of Organizational Behavior and Change Management will increase the efficiencies of these transformations enabling units to realize the inherent effects sooner with less stress placed on the organizations' members.

About The Author

Major Jason L. Sander received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of Washington in 2001. Following graduation from the Aircraft Maintenance Officer School at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, he was a maintenance officer with the 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson AFB, Alaska. From 2001 to 2004 he worked both flightline and backshop operations supporting F-16CJ and A/OA-10 aircraft. Following Eielson, Major Sander moved to the 92nd Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. While active duty, he directed flightline maintenance operations and the quality assurance program for the assigned KC-135 R/T aircraft. In 2007, Major Sander transitioned from active duty with the 92nd to the 141st Air Refueling wing, Washington Air National Guard. Major Sander continues to work in the Maintenance Group as the Commander of the Maintenance Operations Flight, 141st Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. In 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) team recommended association of the 92nd and 141st Wings. Having been stationed at Fairchild since 2004, Major Sander was in a unique position to have experienced working with both units prior to, as well as after the association process. This experience is partially why this topic is a point of interest to him.

Academically, Major Sander received his Bachelor's Degree from the University of Washington in Forest Resources Management in 2001, and his first Master's Degree in Leadership and Management from Webster University in 2008. In 2011, Major Sander earned a second Master's from Air University in Military Operational Art and Science while attending Air Command and Staff College. In 2013, Major Sander earned a third Master's Degree in Aerospace Studies while attending Air University's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Upon graduation, Major Sander will be assigned to NGB/A8X at Andrews AFB, MD.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

History is replete with examples of militaries that failed due to their inability to transform organizations and culture, adopt new operational concepts, or leverage breakthrough technologies. But militaries do not fail by themselves. Failure occurs in the context of an overall, national debacle, caused by systemic problems that fall into three distinct but related categories: failure to anticipate, failure to learn, and failure to adapt. In contrast, victory comes to those who foresee, recognize, and act on changes in the strategic environment. To succeed – indeed, to avoid catastrophic failure – we must redefine the Air Force for the 21st Century.

T. Michael Moseley, 18th Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Dec 2007

“Leadership is the Art and Science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the assigned mission.”¹

AFDD 1-1, 18 Feb 2004

General Moseley hit the nail on the head. Organizations fail because they fail to anticipate, fail to learn, and fail to adapt. History is the best teacher when it comes to lessons about change. Government and military organizations are not the only organizations that can suffer from a failure to adapt. Civilian organizations can also fall prey to issues of adaptation. Yet even with this knowledge in hand, one could ask why we continue to fall victim to the same problems time and again? The answer is because human nature abhors change. Change is involved in every aspect of anticipation, learning and adaptation. Change is similar to uncertainty in many ways. It makes people

¹ “Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1” (USAF, February 18, 2004), vii, <http://www.peterson.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-081124-060.pdf>.

feel uncomfortable and out of place and takes away their ability to anticipate the future. Unmanaged change leads to chaos. Chaos leads to inefficiency. In resource-constrained environments, inefficiencies can lead to failure.

The combination of unpredictable people and constantly changing environments leads to vast amounts of uncertainty and unpredictability. Gary Posen, author of *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, wrote about uncertainty in military organizations, and stressed that in order for organizations to pursue their purposes, “they must coordinate and control the contributions of large numbers of variable human beings in the context of an uncertain environment.”² To overcome these variables, Posen said that organizations create standard operating procedures and routines. Over time, these standards and routines turn into cultures and norms. Cultures and norms help solidify an organization’s desire for things to stay the same. In order to overcome the forces keeping organizations the same, leaders have had to learn how to deal with the diverse variables of people and their environments. The world of sociology and the expansion of its study have provided knowledge and insights to this field over the past several decades. The study of organizational behavior and change management has helped to give leaders a better understanding of the many factors that influence the success of change within an organization.

Good leadership always makes a difference. Combining the study of organizational behavior and change management provides tools for leaders at all levels. Both formal and informal leaders can utilize the knowledge behind these principles to help positively affect change within their organizations and help them adapt to ever-

² Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine, France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1984), 43–44.

changing environments. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, theories of organizational behavior combined with models that help to affect change positively, can potentially mean the difference between the success and failure of an organization. Utilizing these principles in the transformation of today's organizations is imperative.

Constrained resources are nothing new. From early campaigns between Athens and Sparta to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders have had to deal with limited resources. Recent economic downturns have only highlighted in modern military organizations the need to continue to seek greater efficiencies. In today's environments, as General Moseley said, we must change and adapt to our new environment or face extinction and failure. The problem in front of the Department of Defense is how to adapt to our new environment and manage the change process to gain greater efficiencies from our military and civilian forces. In order to save resources, we must do more with less. The answer beginning in the 1970s was a total force concept. Since then, it has continued to grow and has become Total Force Integration (TFI). The military's senior leaders have identified TFI as the process that will help US forces adapt to the 21st Century. From the Air Force perspective, Total Force Integration is the amalgamation of the active and reserve components comprised of the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserves and the Active Duty Air Force at the workforce level.³ What this paper intends to solve, is how today's formal and informal leaders can use the principles of organizational behavior theories and change management models to increase the efficiency of current and future TFI associations within the TFI initiative.

³ Harry Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007), iii–iv.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential impacts of organizational behavior and change management theories and models on the Air Force's Total Force Initiative. Although any leader should be able to utilize the organizational behavior and change management tools identified in this study, this paper's intended audience centers on the formal and informal leaders affected by the TFI process primarily at the operational and tactical levels. The constrained resources of the past several decades have driven senior leaders to evaluate the efficiency of operations when looking at ways, means and ends. Efforts to increase efficiency are often constrained by social behaviors, cultures, and norms, de-railing positive actions through misperceptions and fears. Overlaying the behavioral sciences with the study of historical and present association case studies under TFI, can help build better organizational structures in the future and create better implementation procedures for future TFI associations. Analytical findings can aid future leaders, both formal and informal, in attempts to increase their effectiveness and chances of success while attempting such major mergers. In times of fiscal austerity, leaders look to gain efficiencies to offset dwindling budgets. Increasing the efficiency of our TFI associations will give the Air Force greater readiness and combat capabilities with reduced costs.

Additional benefits from following this study's recommendations may include increased mission performance, reduction of waste, and increased access to capabilities for the Air Force and other organizations within the United States of America and abroad. With several case studies now available, combining organizational behavior theories and change management models with issues found before, during and after the association process, will give leaders the ability to tailor the process of their association to fit the

needs of their organization from the beginning, increasing their chances of success exponentially. The bottom line is the Total Force Initiative needs educated leaders to manage the change process in order to minimize inefficiencies induced by chaos that will eventually lead to failure.

Methodology

Through the analysis of case studies, findings showing the reasons for success and failure, viewed through the lenses of social science, allows for the development of procedures that can increase the effectiveness and chances of success for future associations. This paper will create an easy to use framework that will help illustrate the power and potential of good leadership in the association process. To start with, the reader should truly understand the importance behind the reason for change. Change for the sake of change is never helpful and only leads to chaos and failure. Chapter 2 will take an in-depth look at the Total Force Integration initiative starting with its birth in 1970 through its life in today's associations. It will explore what TFI is, why it is important to the Air Force today, and illustrate the broad spectrum of units affected currently and in the future. It is then important to understand the tools available through organizational behavior theories and change management models.

Chapter 3 will focus on the different theories associated with the study of organizational behavior. It will lay out the models associated with change management research. Having the proper tool to fix a problem is essential. It increases efficiency and raises the chances of success exponentially. As a combined field of study between psychology, sociology, communications, and management, organizational behavior looks at the relationships between individuals, groups, and structures within an organization,

and illustrates how these relationships affect the behavior of individuals within those organizations. Change management models take the same study of psychology, sociology, communications, and management and show how leaders can help move members of the organization through the process of change. Often times, reassuring employees of their future employment, and managing their level of uncertainty are all it takes to make changes stick.

With a solid understanding of what TFI is and how change can best occur, this paper will take the reader on a journey through three of the 121 organizations currently undergoing associations or affected by change instituted from the TFI process. Analyzing these case studies will allow the reader to understand the crucial role leadership plays in the change process. Through information provided by the Air Force Lessons Learned database and through personal interviews, the reader will be shown the common struggles faced by units undergoing change without following the critical steps of a change model. Correlations or differences in leadership styles, primary mission sets, and types of associations whether classic, active, ARC, or hybrid may all play a role. Through this database and personal interviews, we can determine how the unit change was dealt with, if culture played a part in the success or failure, and what the role of leadership was before and after the implementation.

Chapter 5 will encompass the analysis of the findings resulting from the case studies. Correlations between leadership involvement and the struggles of units will be clear. How leadership uses organizational behavior theories and change management models should be evident in the results of the data. Lastly, Chapter 6 will provide the summation of the data and potential recommendations for future leaders starting the TFI

process. These recommendations will help future leaders increase the efficiency of their TFI initiative within their units, potentially saving time, reducing the waste of precious resources, and increasing the efficiency of the TFI process.

Limitations and Assumptions

The potential limitations involved with this study center on the diversity of mission sets and capabilities of active and reserve units in the United States Air Force. If mission sets are too diverse or the resources involved to support capabilities are too limited, it may override the attempts of great leaders to fit these models to such diverse possibilities. It will be necessary to analyze all of the factors associated with applying the TFI process to potential units to ensure TFI is applicable and beneficial from the start. No matter how good leaders are at attempting to associate different units, there may be obstacles too great to overcome to make the TFI effort succeed. If leaders skip this step in the process, or they do not pay enough attention to it up front, the chance of success will decrease significantly.

The worlds of psychology and sociology are constantly growing and changing. At the time of writing, this paper includes the most current and up to date research and studies affecting this analysis. As time marches on, subject matter experts will change. New experts will voice their thoughts and ideas in the conversation and propose new ideas, theories, and models. They might even modify or dispel current or past ideas, theories, and models. Future leaders must stay current on new psychological and sociological studies to ensure they are using the best theories and models for leading their

diverse organizations and helping those organizations to anticipate, learn, and adapt to the ever-changing environments of the future.

Chapter 2

The Total Force Initiative

What is the Total Force Initiative

The concept of Total Force started back in the early 1970s, when the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin R. Laird, initiated his ideas, which envisioned an advantageous mix of the Active and Reserve Components of the military forces.¹ Since that time, legislation such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has led to increased integration amongst the services and across the Department of Defense. The intentional design of the Total Force integration concept is to lead the Air Force to a more flexible, capable force that can capitalize on the strengths of the reserve components while optimizing capabilities within fiscal and resource constraints.²

Within the last decade, fiscal constraints and increasing operations tempos linked with limited capacities have continually highlighted the need for change driving government leaders to look for long-range plans better fitting anticipated constraints. As an example, the 18th AF Commander, Lt Gen Mark Ramsay hosted a two-day TFI summit just last year at Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility highlighting similar factors. During the summit, Lt Gen Ramsay noted that the environment we face today with more capability, but less capacity makes TFI imperative to ensuring the Air Force

¹ Patrick M. Cronin, "The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective" (Center for Naval Analysis, June 24, 1987), 6, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/2787007800.pdf>.

² Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, 1.

continues to become even more efficient and effective.³ In 2003, Congress amended the Base Closure and Realignment Act requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a 20-year force structure plan commencing in FY 2005.⁴ The Air Force's Strategic Directorate took the lead from November 2002 through September 2004 to create a fiscally realistic, long-term force structure plan. The intent was also to be able to use this plan to aid the base realignment and closure decisions and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.⁵ This two-year process led to the development of the 2025 Force Structure Plan, as well as highlighted several issues including an aging aircraft fleet.

In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited the average age of the Air Forces' aircraft fleet was 23 years old, with many of the tanker and bomber aircraft being closer to 40 years old.⁶ The GAO report on Defense Management and the Air Force Future Total Force annotated that in the service's history, this is the oldest the aircraft fleet has been.⁷ The report noted that one of the bigger challenges the Air Force faces over the next two decades is the recapitalization, modernization, and upgrades of the inventory within its aging fleet, particularly due to current budget constraints. In November of 2003, at the fall CORONA⁸ meeting, Air Force leaders received a briefing on the 2025 Force Structure Plan that the Joint Staff received the month prior. Questions

³ Major Michael Meridith, USAF, "CSAF: Total Force Integration Key to Increased Effectiveness," Air Force News, *The Official Web Site of the U.S. Air Force*, April 11, 2012, 1, <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123297568>.

⁴ "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 as Amended Through FY 05 Authorization Act," *www.defense.gov*, 34, accessed May 1, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/brac/docs/legis05.pdf>.

⁵ *Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts* (US Government Accountability Office, January 2006), 8, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-232.

⁶ *Defense Management*, 6.

⁷ *Defense Management*, 6.

⁸ CORONA is a meeting of senior Air Force officials to include the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This tradition was born out of the first strategic planning meeting/dinner and commanders' conference of Chief of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay. Dr. Phil Tucker, "Brief History of the Corona (Commander's) Conferences" (Air Force History Office, September 2005), 2, <http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110815-030.pdf>.

arose from the Joint Staff regarding the adequacy of the combat air forces in the plan. Further analysis, performed by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency Tiger Team confirmed the plan was the best option.⁹ Part of the consternation associated with the plan revolved around the cutting of the aging F-16 aircraft and replacing them with fewer, but more capable, F-22 and F-35 aircraft. This was significant for the Air National Guard, because the F-16 fleet comprised a significant portion of the ANG fighter fleet, and the expectation existed that “some ANG units would lose their aircraft and associated flying missions as a result.”¹⁰ However, the intent of the 2025 Force Structure Plan was to optimize the Air Force’s capabilities within anticipated budget constraints that would still meet the intent of the National Defense Strategy.

Air Force leaders recognized that the capabilities required to meet future challenges would require “a combination of new, more capable aircraft that will cost billions of dollars, including \$63.8 billion currently [2006] estimated for the F/A-22,” so they embarked on what they called the “Future Total Force.”¹¹ Throughout this process, participants from the Active Duty and the Air National Guard recognized that the smaller proposed force structure would require a greater integration of active and reserve components.¹² At the same time that the Air Force was developing the 2025 plan, the Air National Guard was also looking internally. Air National Guard leaders were trying to ensure the Guard was being proactive in helping the Air Force leadership look for new roles and missions that would best suit the Guard and help it remain “a ready, relevant

⁹ *Defense Management*, 11–12.

¹⁰ *Defense Management*, 13.

¹¹ *Defense Management*, 1.

¹² *Defense Management*, 11.

component of the Future Total Force.”¹³ The Air National Guard referred to this transformational effort as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy. The intent of the program was to establish a forum where state adjutants general and units could identify possible new missions that would be appropriate to their states. Although the Air Force and Reserve Components proceeded with implementation efforts of the Future Total Force transformation concept, they did so without a fully developed management framework. The GAO report on Defense Management highlighted this problem and recommended correction immediately. As a response, the Air Force wrote Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-10, published in June 2006, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-1001, published May 2007, to govern the Total Force Integration policies for the Air Force.¹⁴

These documents call for three main type of associations between the active and reserve components. The first structure is the classic association model, where a regular active AF (RegAF) component unit host shares a mission with one or more Air Reserve Component (ARC) units. In a classic association, the active component unit is responsible for the weapon system, while the system is shared with a collocated, but separate Reserve Component unit. This type of association builds on the lineage of the Reserve Associate Program; a program whereby the experience and manpower of Reservists were used to augment active duty units.¹⁵ The second type of association is the active association, in which the roles are reversed from the classic style. The third type of association is the Air Reserve Component (ARC) Association. In the ARC

¹³ *Defense Management*, 1.

¹⁴ “Air Force Instruction 90-1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration” (United States Air Force, May 29, 2007); “Air Force Policy Directive 90-10, Total Force Integration Policy” (United States Air Force, June 16, 2006).

¹⁵ AF / A8XF, “Total Force Initiative Paper,” July 5, 2012, 2.

association, an ARC host shares a mission with one or more ARC associates.¹⁶ For example, in Niagara Falls, New York, the Air National Guard's 107th Airlift Wing associated with the Reserve's 914th Airlift Wing, flying the C-130H2 Hercules aircraft. Throughout all three styles of associations, the commanders in each component retain administrative control over their personnel. Originally, there were two additional forms of associations known as the blended and integrated associations. However, the Air Force discontinued them due to difficulties accompanying their difficult command and management relationships. In July of 2012, the Air Force created a fourth type of association formatted similarly to the main three styles, known as the hybrid association. With this style, the ARC host shares common missions with one or more ARC and RegAF associates.¹⁷ The Air Force is expecting a Force Support Squadron association to be the first example of this type of association. Although the past 30 years have been somewhat difficult in trying to create the perfect symbiosis between the active and reserve components, the goal was effectively captured in AFI 90-1001. "The goal of Total Force Integration is to provide the Air Force and the Combatant Commanders the best possible capabilities to meet their requirements by leveraging the combined human resources of the Regular, Guard, and Reserve members, Air Force civilian employees, and Air Force contractors."¹⁸ The vision of the Total Force Integration Program is "the dynamic and effective integration of all Air Force components to provide unparalleled air, space, and cyberspace power for the joint warfighter."¹⁹

¹⁶ "AFPD 90-10," 3.

¹⁷ AF / A8XF, "Total Force Initiative Paper," 2.

¹⁸ "AFI 90-1001," 4.

¹⁹ "AFI 90-1001," 4.

In its current state per AFI 90-1001, final approval for all integration initiatives resides with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force.²⁰ Before submission to the Chief for final approval though, the initiative must pass many layers of review and approval to ensure it meets the compelling foundation that each suggestion is requirements driven, and supports the Total Force objective of meeting a combatant commander's surge and steady state requirements.²¹ Figure 1 illustrates the relationships and process by which integration initiatives come about.²² Units slated for association will also be required to fill out an Integration Plan (I-PLAN). The purpose of the I-PLAN is to illustrate the details of the integration from the construct (type of association, whether classic, active, ARC, hybrid), to the overview, the command relationships, and the planning, programming, budgeting, and manpower requirements to execute the mission.²³ The I-Plan is designed to lay out and answer on paper how the units will operate.

²⁰ As of 28 Jan, 2013, A Total Force Task Force (TF2) has been stood up to develop strategic options on the appropriate Total Force capabilities mix to meet current and future AF requirements. TF2 will be led by three Major Generals, one from each component. They will work under the supervision of the AF/A8 and in coordination with the NGB/CF and AF/RE and will direct a matrixed organization that will include members from all components and representatives from across the Secretariat and HAF Staff. Ref memo signed by Michael Donley and Gen Mark Welsh, III, 28 Jan 2013 addressed to AF/A8.

²¹ "AFI 90-1001," 5.

²² "AFI 90-1001," 38.

²³ "AFI 90-1001," 38–39.




Figure 1. Integration Initiative Coordination Relationships
Source: AFI 90-1001, 39

Why Now

The way the Department of Defense utilizes forces today is different from how leaders initially designed and structured the system to work many decades ago. The Department of Defense no longer holds the reserve components as a strategic reserve. Instead, the DoD started to utilize these forces operationally to complete the mission, as well as to augment and reinforce the active component.²⁴ Starting in the 1970s, the Guard and Reserve took on greater responsibility and increased mission sets for steady

²⁴ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, 1.

state Air Force missions.²⁵ During that initial decade, the Guard and Reserve were responsible for more than half of all homeland air defense alert missions with the Guard's F-101s, F-102s, and F-106s.²⁶ Through the years, military leaders found that it took support from the total force to generate the capabilities required to fight the wars the United States has been involved in over the past 40 years. In 2004, the Air Force presented three compelling reasons for integration: "Integration allows balancing personnel tempo appropriately among the components; Integration plays to the strengths of each component; Integration provides a continuum of service, an expansion of institutional knowledge, and preservation of human capital" across the DoD.²⁷ Integrating forces across the active and reserve component can leverage tremendous experience levels as well as provide the ability to sustain increasing levels of deployments.²⁸ A RAND study published in 2007 researched and analyzed potential considerations for associating active and reserve capabilities. Through their research, they found three main goals for blending the work force of the active and reserve components. These three goals were to improve readiness, improve efficiency, and lower cost.²⁹ All three of these goals fit perfectly with current resource constraints facing today's military forces, as economic challenges and resource constraints continue to force military organizations to do more with less and become more efficient in the process. The bottom line is, Total Force Integration is happening now because the Air Force leaders have determined it is the best way to ensure we meet the challenges of tomorrow's missions while operating within the fiscal constraints of today's and tomorrow's anticipated budgets.

Total Force Integration Challenges

As to be expected, there are many challenges facing the Air Force and its components working through the Total Force Integration process. Challenges arising

²⁵ AF / A8XF, "Total Force Initiative Paper," 1.

²⁶ AF / A8XF, "Total Force Initiative Paper," 1.

²⁷ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, 5.

²⁸ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, 6.

²⁹ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, 8.

from the concept of TFI at the DoD level encompass issues like “command and control, operational availability, readiness reporting, component-specific funding, deployment availability, geographical dispersion, training availability, operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) funding, equipment modernization and compatibility, property accountability, command opportunity, work scheduling, career and job expectations, personnel performance evaluations, and supporting pay and personnel information systems.”³⁰ At the operational and tactical levels, the challenges are even more significant. On the front lines of the change effort, Airmen at all levels have to overcome the emotions integral with change. Any time someone or something induces uncertainty into an environment, it can create a ripple effect throughout the organization. Associations often involve moving locations, or offices, breaking up groups and creating new ones, all of which negatively affect daily operations. Change also affects areas not easily seen.

Culture and heritage are two areas that highly impact how a unit operates, and they both play significant roles in the association of units. Each unit will come to the association with its own distinct culture and rich heritage, which neither unit will want to see changed. However, in order to capitalize on the efficiencies of the association and maximize the benefits, everyone involved in the association will need to see how the new organization will work, and understand how as much of their individual cultures and heritage will be incorporated into the new organization as possible. Chapter 3 provides additional background on culture and will discuss effective ways to help leaders with this change from the beginning to the end.

Total Force Integration also comes with many significant political challenges. Anything from a unit’s location to the resources it has available will become highly political issues. Senators and Congressmen care deeply about changes affecting their constituents and seldom are willing to sacrifice funding or resources that benefit their areas for the greater good. Governors too, have a strong interest in their National Guard

³⁰ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, xv.

units, and the employment of those units for state active duty or in Title 32 status can be very problematic within integrated units.”³¹

Legal Constraints

Leadership has had to overcome many hurdles in order to make the Total Force associations more functional. For example, the DoD worked with Congress to develop legislation to help clarify lines of authority between the active component, the reserve component, DoD civilian employees, and DoD Contractor personnel, which had been highlighted by TFI associations. The flexibility gained from the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act enabled Reserve and Guard members, regardless of status, to instruct active duty military, foreign military, DoD contractor personnel, and DoD civilian employees.³² Without this very important legislation, reserve component personnel would not have the legal authority necessary to carry out their duties while in a mixed environment. For example, active and classic associations blend the organizing, training, and equipping functions between Active, Reserve, and Guard organizations. Without this key piece of legislation, a Guard host unit could not provide training to associated active duty unit.

³¹ Thie et al., *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units*, xvii.

³² “H.R. 5122 (109th): John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,” *GovTrack.US*, January 1, 2006, 111, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr5122enr/pdf/BILLS-109hr5122enr.pdf>.

Chapter 3

The Role of Leadership in Change

Organizational Behavior

“Organizational behavior (OB) is a field of study devoted to understanding, explaining, and ultimately improving the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and groups in organizations.”¹ Organizational behavior also studies and analyzes why actions and events happen the way they do, the purposes that they may serve, and the effects change or transformation may have on people.² There are four main categories within the field of organizational behavior; how group dynamics and social interaction shape employee behavior, how work organizations are structured, why organizational controls occur in the way they do, and how organizational processes have an impact on societal and ecological stability or instability.³ The purpose behind OB is to apply the knowledge gained from research and analysis toward the overall improvement of an organization’s effectiveness. By studying and learning the effects from OB, leaders can influence these human factors to increase efficiencies and effectiveness within their organizations.

Many diverse areas of study provide the foundation for the OB field of study; however, some of the key areas are psychology, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science. These fields are critical because organizations are simply microcosms of our larger societies. Similar to a society level study, within an

¹ Jason Colquitt, Jeffery A LePine, and Michael J Wesson, *Organizational Behavior: Improving Performance and Commitment in the Workplace* (New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2011), 7.

² John Bratton, *Work and Organizational Behaviour: Understanding the Workplace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 8.

³ Bratton, *Work and Organizational Behaviour*, 5.

organization, industrial and organizational psychology provide the OB field with information regarding job performance and individual characteristics, whereas social psychology provides the field with information about job satisfaction, emotions, and team processes.⁴ The study of sociology helps researchers understand why organizations form, and illuminates the social context with which individuals in organizations interact. Anthropology research provides a study of organizational culture and helps provide information about how humans interact with their environment. The study of political science from an organizational behavior standpoint highlights the science of politics within an organization. Power struggles are just as evident in organizations as they are in larger societies. Overall, the combination of all of these separate fields gives researchers and analysts a broader approach to looking at organizations.

Within the field of OB, the organizational unit provides the contextual framework within which researchers can study human interactions. Individual or group behavior in its simplest form occurs within organizations. The following four characteristics help define a work organization.⁵ First, there must be a group of people with something in common, who deliberately and consciously design a structure and processes. Second, the human activity is directed towards accomplishing a goal or set of objectives. Third, an identifiable boundary must exist that establishes common membership of the people to the group. Last, a connection must exist from the organization to the external society, drawing attention to the fact that the organizational activities and action influence the environment or larger society. Breaking down the organization into these four basic parts

⁴ Colquitt, LePine, and Wesson, *Organizational Behavior*, 8.

⁵ Bratton, *Work and Organizational Behaviour*, 5-6.

allows practitioners to dissect an organization and grasp a better understanding of all of its parts.

Because of the amount of diversity within the field of organizational behavior, it helps to have a visual reference that illustrates how it all fits together. Figure 2 shows one potential way of organizing the many factors providing input into organizational behavior theories.⁶ The individual outcomes shown on the right side of the model pertain to employees and managers. The study of these two outcomes will help enable employees to achieve greater job performance while nurturing organizational commitment, and help managers maximize employee performance and increase employee retention.⁷ A combination of group mechanisms and individual characteristics influence the individual mechanisms that affect the individual outcomes. Overall, researchers in the field of organizational behavior want to know how they can manipulate the factors on the left and center of the chart to produce the best outcomes on the right side of the chart. Leaders and employees alike want to learn more about organizational behavior factors that increase productivity and satisfaction because it can help employees increase job satisfaction and help leaders increase organizational performance.

Early pioneers in the field of organizational behavior such as Frederick Winslow Taylor (1865–1915), learned early on the importance of studying organizational behaviors. Taylor is regarded as the founding figure of management philosophy in the United States.⁸ Having worked many jobs within industry, Taylor became concerned

⁶ Colquitt, LePine, and Wesson, *Organizational Behavior*, 8. Colquitt, et al utilize this figure as a means to illustrate to students how the 15 chapters in their text book fit together. This illustration provides a roadmap for students to help clarify the relations between all of the factors contributing to the field of organizational behavior.

⁷ Colquitt, LePine, and Wesson, *Organizational Behavior*, 8.

⁸ Helga Drummond, *Introduction to Organizational Behaviour* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41, <http://search.ebscohost.com/direct.asp?db=bth&jid=T62&scope=site>.




Figure 2 Integrative Model of Organizational Behavior

Source: Colquitt, LePine, and Wesson, *Organizational Behavior*, 8.

with the divide between management and the workforce.⁹ He eventually came up with what he called "Scientific Management," which centered on planning and control of work enabling greater outputs from the same level of work.¹⁰

The field of organizational behavior has its roots in research accomplished while studying and testing organizational theories. In 1776, Adam Smith published and popularized the ideas of mass production with his analysis of the industrial practices of a pin factory. Smith found that workers specializing in certain tasks allowed for increases in productivity by a factor of hundreds.¹¹ His observations of workers in the pin factory eventually led to his division of labor concept as originally explained in *Wealth of Nations* in 1776.¹² "Smith's concept of division of labor formed the conceptual basis for a powerful administrative approach to reducing cost, increasing productivity, and maximizing profits."¹³ Theorists for the next two centuries would continue to build on Smith's division of labor concepts whether writing classical, neoclassical, or contemporary organizational theories. Major classical theorists of the past century include Frederick Taylor's 1911 theory of scientific management, Max Weber's 1947 theory writing about his concept of bureaucracy, and Henri Fayol's 1949 classical organizational theory.¹⁴ Classical theory revolved around the four distinct components of

⁹ Drummond, *Introduction to Organizational Behaviour*, 41.

¹⁰ Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, Kindle Edition (A Public Domain Book, 1911), 40.

¹¹ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Lawrence, KS: Digireads.com Publishing, 2009), 7–8.

¹² Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 9.

¹³ John A Talbott and Robert E Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry: New Concepts for a Changing Behavioral Health System* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Pub., 2001), 34.

¹⁴ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 36.

hierarchy of authority, span of control, centralization versus decentralization, and specialization of function or task.¹⁵

The neoclassical theory era started with the Hawthorne studies in 1927. A group of researchers led by Elton Mayo, a Harvard Business School Professor, performed research at the Western Electric Hawthorne Works in Chicago.¹⁶ The group was studying the effects of Taylor's scientific management theory on female workers and attempting to determine the ideal working conditions that would bring production levels to capacity. During the tests, researchers observed two groups while they performed similar work tasks. Among other factors, Group 1 had lighting levels varied to test whether physical work conditions affected production levels. The second group was the control group in which lighting levels remained the same. Researchers were surprised to discover that productivity was not tied to the level of lighting in either room as production improved in both groups. Instead, the results of the Hawthorne Studies indicated the level of work performance was tied to "the attention of the research team, the relationships of the employees, and the employee motivation, rather than an ideal work condition."¹⁷ In 1933, through Mayo's studies, the human relations movement was introduced, "which focused on social factors, such as treatment by management and relationships among colleagues, and not economic factors, as the driving forces behind human behavior in an organization."¹⁸

¹⁵ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 34.

¹⁶ "Human Relations Contributors. Employee Motivation. Motivation in the Work Place," *Human Relations School of Management*, accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.accel-team.com/motivation/hawthorne_02.html.

¹⁷ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 39.

¹⁸ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 39.

Following Mayo in 1960 was Douglas McGregor, with his organizational theories of Theory X and Theory Y. McGregor realized through his research and analysis that “classical theory did not perceive benefits in a decentralized organization because of the perception of basic human nature implicit in classical theory.”¹⁹ Early classical theorists such as Fayol, interpreted human nature as inherently lazy, showing little ambition to strive for more than the minimum needed to survive. McGregor labeled this classical approach to human behavior as Theory X. McGregor argued Theory Y, however, was more in line with actual human nature, by which “individuals seek out responsibility and have an innate desire to achieve success.”²⁰ Managers following a Theory Y approach would give decision-making authority to their subordinates, encouraging them to become more involved and invested in the success of the organization. The decentralization of authority within the organizational structure is one of the key contributions of the neoclassical approach to organizational theory.²¹

The contemporary era of organizational theory takes on more of a systems approach, with its foundation in the learning organization. “Systems thinking overcomes the boundaries of the classical and neoclassical theorists, who examined separate components of the organization and placed them in a static structure. Systems thinking recognizes a much more dynamic process involving constant adaptive organizational change derived from a self-connecting feedback process that provides necessary information to learn from mistakes and develop better adaptational forms.”²²

¹⁹ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 37.

²⁰ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 39.

²¹ Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 39.

²² Talbott and Hales, *Textbook of Administrative Psychiatry*, 41.

Describing systems theory in conjunction with organizational behavior often comes back to a metaphor of an organization as a biological organism.²³ This metaphor makes sense for several reasons. First, from the biological perspective, like a living organism, organizations want to survive. In addition, in both cases, with the organism and the organization, the key to survival revolves around the relationship with the environment.²⁴ In order to survive, organisms and organizations must adapt, change, and renew themselves continually. Although metaphors can facilitate our understanding of a concept, they can also constrain it as well. Leaders need to ensure the metaphors they use to help employees understand the organization, do not also stifle how employees see the organization.

Parallel to the development of some of the neoclassical organizational theories, new research and analysis was growing in the field of psychology as well. From 1939 through 1943, Abraham Maslow was developing his theory of psychology around the five basic needs of physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization or self-fulfillment.²⁵ Figure 3 illustrates Maslow's needs in the shape of a pyramid, which best demonstrates how Maslow saw them. As employers would meet the needs of a worker, that worker would move up the needs pyramid until they reached the point of self-actualization or self-fulfillment. As the field of organizational behavior grew, theorists started incorporating more of the human psychology aspects into their respective theories. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, for example, fits well into the motivation theories leaders currently use to help boost employee performance and productivity. Past management

²³ Drummond, *Introduction to Organizational Behaviour*, 23.

²⁴ Drummond, *Introduction to Organizational Behaviour*, 23.

²⁵ "Human Relations Contributors. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," *Human Relations School of Management*, accessed March 19, 2013, http://www.accel-team.com/human_relations/hrels_02_maslow.html.

reward systems focused on satisfying a worker's lower level needs such as safety or physiological security, however, future management reward systems should focus on




Figure 3 Maslow's Pyramid of Needs

Source: Maslow's Pyramid of Needs ("Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," Chart Diagram, accessed March 18, 2013, <http://chartdiagram.com/maslows-hierarchy-of-needs/>).

higher levels of worker needs to help create a more productive and committed work environment.²⁶

Taking into account the increased knowledge of human psychology researched and developed several decades ago, a better understanding of the worker's needs demonstrates how change in the work place can affect organizational behaviors. Changes in organizational culture, structure, leadership styles, leadership behaviors, team characteristics, or team dynamics, can all have significant impacts on an individual's job performance or organizational commitment. It is important for leaders to understand organizational behavior dynamics, and how their good or bad leadership can positively or

²⁶ "Human Relations Contributors. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs."

negatively influence an employee's performance and commitment within the organization.²⁷ This is where the study of change management comes into play.

Change Management

Change management is a subset of the field of organizational behavior. When executed correctly, change should be a structured approach within an organization's change process that is developed to help leaders and individuals cope with the process of change. As described above, many factors influence the output of individual performance and commitment, and change at any level will have significant impacts throughout an organization. Unmanaged or unstructured change leads to chaos within an organization. Chaos tends to lead to inefficiencies, which in turn can lead to failure. In today's markets, failure to change or failure of change can be fatal for an organization or business.

Social networking and mobile adaptability have revolutionized organizations on a time scale never before seen because of the amount of change they can induce in a short amount of time. The instant access to massive amounts of data combined with the power of social networking drives an ever-increasing need for change within organizations. This phenomenon only highlights the increasing need for change management both in government and in private industry. The exponential growth in technology also increases the need for change within all types of organizations. For example, let us look at the growth of computer technology over the past 30 years or so. Ray Kurzweil, author of *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, uses the example of transistors in Intel's latest computer

²⁷ "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," *Chart Diagram*, accessed March 18, 2013, <http://chartdiagram.com/maslows-hierarchy-of-needs/>.

chip to illustrate the exponential growth curve of chip technology. Using the characteristics of Moore's Law, he demonstrates how in 1972, there were 3500 transistors in Intel's latest computer chip and by 1997, that number had grown to 7.5 million.²⁸ Kurzweil also points out, that this growth curve was not limited to the type of hardware used. In the 1980s, he and several other observers noticed that "the speed and density of computation have been doubling every three years (at the beginning of the twentieth century) to one year (at the end of the twentieth century), regardless of the type of hardware used."²⁹ The exponential increase in technology drove massive change in the industry. If companies failed to anticipate, learn, and adapt, they failed to stay relevant and stay in business.

If we take this example into the model of a modern-day Air Force, we can demonstrate the same type of exponential growth in technology by looking at the capabilities of an airplane. From December 17, 1903 to the present, the same exponential growth is visible starting with the Wright Flyer and comparing it to the most current model of the F-35. This technology has driven significant changes in tactics, training, operations, organizational structures, as well as strategy. If we overlay the speed of technological change and the power of social media, military organizations failing to anticipate, learn, and adapt, will face the same failure witnessed in the Kodak example below. All of these cases are utilized to illustrate a point: Change is inevitable, and technology only increases the speed at which it will happen. Leaders today must be able to adapt to change quickly, and they must be able to help their organization do the same.

²⁸ Ray Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines, When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2000), 21.

²⁹ Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, 25.

The executives at Kodak did not foresee the need for change fast enough, and unfortunately for them, their organization became a well-known example of failure in the private industry. The executives at Kodak suffered from a common case of complacency. The company failed to learn and adapt quick enough to stay competitive with the digital revolution.³⁰ Some of its competitors like Fuji were able to transition to the digital film era faster, and thus took valuable market share away from Kodak. Fortunately, this was not a one-failure market for Kodak. However, it is impossible to know if the next failure will be so forgiving.

With this increased need for adaptability in today's organizations, the past two decades have seen a significant rise in the number of companies and individuals claiming to be change agents and facilitators, each with their own ideas and models to follow. John P. Kotter, however, has been an icon in the organizational behavior field for over 40 years. After graduating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Dr. Kotter earned a Master of Science from MIT and then a Doctorate in Business Administration from the Harvard Business School. Dr. Kotter joined the Harvard Business School faculty in 1972 and was awarded tenure and full professorship in 1980 at the age of 33.³¹ Over the past four decades, Dr. Kotter has written over 18 books, printed in seventy foreign language editions, and written articles for the Harvard Business Review with sales exceeding 1.5 million copies. Dr. Kotter is currently the Chief

³⁰ John Kotter, "Barriers to Change: The Real Reason Behind the Kodak Downfall," *Forbes Magazine*: 2, accessed January 24, 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkotter/2012/05/02/barriers-to-change-the-real-reason-behind-the-kodak-downfall/>.

³¹ John P Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 187.

Innovation Officer of Kotter International, an organization that helps organizations accelerate the implementation of their strategies, with less chaos and more efficiency.³²

Dr. Kotter is most widely known for his work in the study of organizational culture, leadership and management, and the development of his eight-step change process, shown in figure 4 below. He has spent his professional career researching, analyzing, and writing about the differences between leadership and management, and their effects on the cultures of their organizations. His research, which provided the basis for his groundbreaking conclusions, commenced in the summer of 1987. Over a four-year period, Dr. Kotter and his team conducted four studies, with the ultimate purpose to determine whether there was a relationship between corporate culture and the long-term economic performance on an organization.³³ If there was, he intended to clarify the nature of that relationship, explore why it exists, and determine whether he could exploit it to augment the organization's performance.³⁴ Through his research and writing, Dr. Kotter found that people who adapt the best to change, seldom do it because they are given spreadsheets and copious amounts of data that tells them they need to. He has found that people change because they are shown a truth that influences their feelings.³⁵ He founded his research on over 400 interviews from 130 different organizations.³⁶ In all of his cases, highly successful change efforts were associated with "people who could find ways to help others see the problems or solutions in ways that influence emotions,

³² "Kotter International," *Kotter International*, accessed March 19, 2013, <http://www.kotterinternational.com/>.

³³ John P Kotter and James L Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York; Toronto; New York: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), vii.

³⁴ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, vii.

³⁵ John P Kotter and Dan S Cohen, *The Heart of Change: Real-Life Stories of How People Change Their Organizations* (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), 1.

³⁶ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 2.

not just thought.”³⁷ The benefits come when those feelings can alter their behavior enough to overcome the many barriers to large-scale change.

The second part to Dr. Kotter’s research on change comes from his study on leadership and management. In order to have a successful change event, a leader must come forth who is willing to step up and initiate the process. It is sometimes difficult to see the differences between a leader and a manager. Dr. Kotter defines leadership as someone who motivates people by satisfying basic human needs, and management as someone who controls people by pushing them in the right direction.³⁸ In his view, leadership and management are not replacements for one another. “Leadership and management are two distinctive and complementary systems of action; each has its own function and characteristic activities, and both are necessary for success in an increasingly complex and volatile business environment.”³⁹ “Management is a set of processes that can keep a complicated system of people and technology running smoothly,” whereas leadership “defines what the future should look like, aligns people with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen despite the obstacles.”⁴⁰ Table 1 illustrates some of the different tasks associated with managers and leaders.

The last significant area of Dr. Kotter’s research deals with organizational culture. Dr. Kotter and his team found that organizational culture has two levels, which differ in terms of visibility and resistance to change.⁴¹ “At the deeper and less visible level, culture refers to values that are shared by the people in a group and that tend to persist

³⁷ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, X.

³⁸ John P Kotter, *John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 60.

³⁹ Kotter, *What Leaders Really Do*, 51.

⁴⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 25.

⁴¹ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 4.

Table 1 Management versus Leadership

Management versus Leadership	
Management	Leadership
<i>Planning and budgeting:</i> establishing detailed steps and timetables for achieving needed results, then allocating the resources necessary to make it happen	<i>Establishing direction:</i> developing a vision of the future— often the distant future— and strategies for producing the changes needed to achieve that vision
<i>Organizing and staffing:</i> establishing some structure for accomplishing plan requirements, staffing that structure with individuals, delegating responsibility and authority for carrying out the plan, providing policies and procedures to help guide people, and creating methods or systems to monitor implementation	<i>Aligning people:</i> communicating direction in words and deeds to all those whose cooperation may be needed so as to influence the creation of teams and coalitions that understand the vision and strategies and that accept their validity
<i>Controlling and problem solving:</i> monitoring results, identifying deviations from plan, then planning and organizing to solve these problems	<i>Motivating and inspiring:</i> energizing people to overcome major political, bureaucratic, and resource barriers to change by satisfying basic, but often unfulfilled, human needs
Produces a degree of predictability and order and has the potential to consistently produce the short-term results expected by various stake-holders (e.g., for customers, always being on time; for stockholders, being on budget)	Produces change, often to a dramatic degree, and has the potential to produce extremely useful change (e.g., new products that customers want, new approaches to labor relations that help make a firm more competitive)

Source: Kotter, John P. Leading Change, pg. 26

over time even when group membership changes.”⁴² These deeper, less visible cultures can be extremely difficult to change because members cannot see many of the values that bind the group together. Culture, however, is very important to an organization. It represents “an interdependent set of values and ways of behaving that are common in a community and that tend to perpetuate themselves, sometimes over long periods of time.”⁴³ These nearly invisible underlying cultures help shape how an organization reacts to problems such as customer issues, and can often speed up decisions made by

⁴² Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 4.

⁴³ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 84.

individuals within the group because of shared beliefs and values. A group's norms and values are the product of a variety of social forces that are frequently subtle, and invisible, but guide the actions of the group to reward those who accept them and ostracize those who do not.⁴⁴ Organizational culture plays a significant role in the change process because sometimes it can help while other times it can undermine it with long-term economic effects.

Dr. Kotter's research helps to highlight the important factor that the role of leadership is still vital in today's organizations. "The single most visible factor that distinguishes major cultural changes that succeed from those that fail is competent leadership at the top."⁴⁵ The organization will always need the visionary leader to steer the organization to needs of tomorrow. Throughout the industry, Dr. Kotter's work in the organizational behavior field is visible in many different forms of change models. In particular, his 8-step change process reflects very similar ideas to the others presented below.

Types of Change Models

There are many different styles of change management models in existence today. For comparison, this paper will look at models from Kurt Lewin, Dr. John Kotter, and Jeffrey Hiatt. These models seem to be the prominent models that are most mentioned across the industry.

Kurt Lewin's model is one of the oldest change models, and the oldest model of the three that will be analyzed in this paper. Kurt Lewin, a German-American

⁴⁴ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 141.

⁴⁵ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 84.

psychologist, is known for his Unfreeze, Change, Refreeze model, which he originally presented in 1947.⁴⁶ The first phase of Lewin's change model is the unfreeze stage. In this stage, individuals, departments, or entire organizations must be motivated for the change that is about to occur.⁴⁷ Human nature will cause individuals to list and weigh the factors for and against the upcoming change. It is important for those leading the change to demonstrate why the change is needed so those affected will be motivated to change. For this reason, this stage is probably the most important stages to understand.⁴⁸

The second stage of Lewin's model is the change or transition phase. Lewin was aware that change was not an event, but more of a process.⁴⁹ Part of the responsibilities required from leaders in phase 1 is ensuring those affected understand that the transition will take time. It is also important for leaders to realize that productivity will decrease some while uncertainty is induced into the organization. Good communication in phase 2 is also important to insure people know what is going on with the change process. This phase is often the hardest phase as u certainty causes people to be unsure of the environment around them and may become fearful of their basic physiological needs.⁵⁰

Lewin's third phase is the freezing or refreezing phase. This phase is about establishing stability and helping people reestablish organizational norms.⁵¹ This phase of the change model will take time, and leaders must understand this. If change happens too quickly, organizations will not have enough time between events to freeze the new changes and create the required norms to make the change stick.

⁴⁶ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," *Change Management Coach*, 2012 2008, http://www.change-management-coach.com/kurt_lewin.html.

⁴⁷ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," 1.

⁴⁸ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," 1.

⁴⁹ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," 2.

⁵⁰ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," 2.

⁵¹ Mark Connelly, "Kurt Lewin Change Management Model," 2.

Kurt Lewin's change model is very simple. This can be helpful, but it can also hurt organizations. Its simplicity offers organizations a simple solution to working through a change process. Often times, however, leaders get stuck not knowing what comes next. Dr. John Kotter's 8-Steps of Change model provides more guidance for leaders and can help ensure better success rates if completed as described below.

In his book, *The Heart of Change*, Dr. Kotter notes that he found that “most people do not handle large-scale change well, that they make predictable mistakes, and that they made these mistakes mostly because they had little exposure to highly successful transformations.”⁵² He designed his change model to address changes in things like strategy, structure, culture, or systems by identifying how to change the behavior of people using their feelings.⁵³ Figure 4 illustrates Dr. Kotter's eight-step process.

⁵² Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, ix.

⁵³ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, x.

"Kotters Eight Steps of Change"



■ Kotter, John P. and Cohen, Dan S. The Heart of Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press

Figure 4 Kotter's Eight Steps of Change

Source: Kotter, John P. and Cohen, Dan S. The Heart of Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press

Step one of the model creates a sense of urgency in order to “get people off the couch and into the game.”⁵⁴ In order for large-scale change to occur, people need to have sufficient levels of motivation to act. In addition, for large-scale change to occur *NOW*, a sense of urgency must be identified. For example, you may know you need to get up and go to work. However, when you realize you overslept and you are already 10 minutes late, your sense of urgency kicks into high gear. The same is true with change. Leaders must show the organization why change must occur, and why it must happen now. Dr. Kotter identifies four sets of behaviors that most commonly stop the launch of needed change: complacency, immobilization, deviance, and hesitation.⁵⁵ Complacency can also

⁵⁴ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 3.

⁵⁵ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 17.

come from the absence of a major and visible crisis, too many visible resources, low overall performance standards, or organizational structures that focus employees on narrow functional goals.⁵⁶ Internal measurement systems that focus on the wrong performance indexes, a lack of sufficient performance feedback from external sources, a kill-the-messenger-of-bad-news, low candor, low confrontation culture, human nature, with its capacity for denial, especially if people are already busy or stressed, or too much happy talk from senior management also contribute to organizational complacency.⁵⁷

Immobilization often kills a change effort because of an individual or group's feeling that it needs to protect itself. As uncertainty increases, individuals and groups may feel a sense of fear or panic.⁵⁸ Pride in ownership or anger can cause individuals or groups to block a change attempt through deviance. Last, pessimistic attitudes can be caustic to change efforts. People who have experienced failed change efforts will be the first to drag their feet, complain about the change, and influence others that it is a bad idea. Think about the negative press surrounding the Air Force's Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO 21) program because of the failure of the Total Quality Management initiative decades before. Individuals and groups have long memories when it comes to change.

Step two of Dr. Kotter's model is designed to build a guiding team for the change event. "More successful change agents pull together a guiding team with credibility, skills, connections, reputations, and formal authority required to provide change leadership."⁵⁹ The effect of a powerful guiding group needs to have two main

⁵⁶ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 40.

⁵⁷ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 40.

⁵⁸ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 17.

⁵⁹ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 4.

characteristics. It must comprise the right people who have the right skills, credibility, and authority to make the change happen, as well as the guiding group must demonstrate teamwork.⁶⁰ These attributes are important so others within the organization will trust the guiding team and be willing to follow its leadership. In addition to teamwork, trust can be developed by utilizing modeling to illustrate to the organization what is needed, using actions that relate with member's emotions, and using the momentum of a 'truth event' to keep people talking about the change.⁶¹

Step three of the model has the guiding team creating a vision. It is important to have a clearly identifiable vision that is not simply detailed plans and budgets.⁶² The vision must create a clear sense of direction for the organization. Large-scale change requires visions and strategies that literally see into the future. Guiding teams must get these visions correct in order for organizations to see possibilities and find motivation to follow through with the change. If done wrong, it can quickly kill the change effort.

Dr. Kotter's fourth step is communicating the vision and strategies effectively in order to create a common understanding to a critical mass of people. The new vision and strategies must be communicated for both understanding and a gut-level buy-in.⁶³ The goal of this step is to get as many people as possible supporting the new vision and selling it to others. This critical step can fail for many reasons. Dr. Kotter suggests the most obvious reason is a lack of clarity.⁶⁴ Communication efforts should be kept simple and heartfelt, not complex and technocratic.⁶⁵ In addition, being aware of organizational

⁶⁰ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 43.

⁶¹ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 53.

⁶² Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 4.

⁶³ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 83.

⁶⁴ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 84.

⁶⁵ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 101.

behaviors will help leaders to understand what organization members may be feeling which can help them dispel fear, anxiety, confusion, anger and distrust.⁶⁶ If members of the organization are unclear about where the change is taking them, or find their emotional needs are no longer being met by the organization, human nature will set in and chaos will ensue. Leaders must ensure a critical mass of the organization truly understands the new vision, has buy-in in the change effort, and feels secure in here the change will take the organization.

All too often, change efforts die because people do not feel empowered to change. For this reason, step five of the change model is all about removing obstacles of change and empowering people to act.⁶⁷ The whole purpose of this step is to help leaders remove the barriers to change. Many people are resistant to change for good reasons. Table 2 lays out methods for dealing with resistance to change. Through using approaches like education and communication, participation, negotiations or agreements, manipulation or coercion, leaders can help individuals who are resistant to the change effort see the benefits of aligning with the guiding team's vision. On caution, however, some of the tactics such as manipulation or coercion may have disastrous drawbacks. Table 2 lists the drawbacks to these approaches as well.

⁶⁶ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 101.

⁶⁷ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 5.

Table 2 Methods for Dealing with Resistance to Change

Methods for Dealing with Resistance to Change			
Approach	Commonly Used in situations	Advantages	Drawbacks
Education + communication	Where there is a lack of information or inaccurate information and analysis.	Once persuaded, people will often help with the implementation of the change	Can be very time consuming if lots of people are involved
Participation + involvement	Where the initiators do not have all the information they need to design the change, and where others have considerable power to resist	People who participate will be committed to implementing change, and any relevant information they have will be integrated into the change plan	Can be very time-consuming if participators design an inappropriate change
Facilitation + support	Where people are resisting because of adjustment problems	No other approach works as well with adjustment problems	Can be time-consuming, expensive, and still fail
Negotiation + agreement	Where someone or some group will clearly lose out in a change, and where that group has considerable power to resist	Sometimes it is a relatively easy way to avoid major resistance	Can be too expensive in many cases if it alerts others to negotiate for compliance
Manipulation + co-optation	Where other tactics will not work or are too expensive	It can be a relatively quick and inexpensive solution to resistance problems	Can lead to future problems if people feel manipulated
Explicit + implicit coercion	Where speed is essential, and the change initiators possess considerable power	It is speedy, and can overcome any kind of resistance	Can be risky if it leaves people mad at the initiators

Source: (Kotter, What Leaders Really Do, pg. 44)

The sixth step of Dr. Kotter's 8-Steps of Change model deals with creating short-term wins. Dr. Kotter explains that these short-term wins are critical as they provide

credibility, resources, and momentum to the change effort.⁶⁸ These small victories feed the emotional needs of the organization by instilling faith in the change effort. They also help feed the motivation of those who are pushing hard to keep the change effort alive. Most importantly, short-term wins keep the critics at bay and build momentum.⁶⁹ Short-term wins must be visible, unambiguous, and well known. What people do not know, did not happen! Leaders must be prepared to create conditions for short-term wins on a sufficient timeline to energize the change helpers, enlighten the pessimists, defuse the cynics, and build momentum for the effort.⁷⁰

Step seven is another critical step in the 8-step process. After seeing mild success from sufficient short-term wins, an organization's members are too quick to call it a victory. Urgency and momentum must continue to build in order to make the change stick. Changes must be incorporated into an organization's culture and norms in order to make them permanent. If the efforts stop short of this, the organization will eventually backslide to where it was before and go back to operating the way it was. Leaders must ensure they are building on the momentum to make the vision a reality and do not declare victory prematurely.⁷¹

The final stage of the change model is making change stick. As stated earlier, the change must become part of the organizations new culture, group norms, and shared values, which develop through consistency over time.⁷² An organization must create a new, supportive, and sufficiently strong culture in order for the change to stick.⁷³ Failure

⁶⁸ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 5.

⁶⁹ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 125.

⁷⁰ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 141.

⁷¹ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 143.

⁷² Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 6.

⁷³ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 161.

to make the change stick will cost significant time, energy, and resources, and could cause drastic effects for the organization. “A culture truly changes only when a new way of operating has been shown to succeed over some minimum period of time. New behaviors will not become norms [and] will not take hold, until the very end of the process.”⁷⁴ Table 3 illustrates the eight steps of change with the associated behaviors that should be seen at each step of the process. Through all of his research, Dr. Kotter’s

Table 3 Behaviors Associated with the 8 Steps of Change Model

The Eight Steps for Successful Large-Scale Change		
Step	Action	New Behavior
1	Increase urgency	People start telling each other, "Let's go, we need to change things!"
2	Build the guiding team	A group powerful enough to guide a big change is formed and they start to work together well.
3	Get the vision right	The guiding team develops the right vision and strategy for the change effort.
4	Communicate for buy-in	People begin to buy into the change, and this shows in their behavior.
5	Empower action	More people feel able to act, and do act, on the vision.
6	Create short-term wins	Momentum builds as people fulfill the vision, while fewer and fewer resist change.
7	Don't let up	People make wave after wave of changes until the vision is fulfilled.
8	Make change stick	New and winning behavior continues despite the pull of tradition, turnover of change leaders, etc.

Source: Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 7

evidence overwhelmingly suggested, “the most fundamental problem in all the stages is changing the behavior of the people.”⁷⁵ Until you can change the behavior, an organization cannot change.

⁷⁴ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 176.

⁷⁵ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 6.

The third change model this paper will explore is the ADKAR model. ADKAR is an acronym that stands for Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability, and Reinforcement. Jeffrey Hiatt in conjunction with the Prosci Company developed this model in 1999 as an outcome-oriented approach to facilitate individual change.⁷⁶ Since its release, this model has taken hold as an easy-to-use, proven Change Management method, which is now one of the most widely used change management models in the world.⁷⁷ The foundational purpose of the ADKAR model is to produce successful change at the individual level. ADKAR utilizes a framework that enables understanding of change at the individual level. From Hiatt's perspective, once change is successful at the individual level, the process can be transposed to larger organizations, businesses and government organizations to increase the likelihood of successfully completing their change events.⁷⁸ Figure 5 illustrates the five categories of the ADKAR Change Model.

⁷⁶ "ADKAR Change Management Model," *Prosci*, accessed March 20, 2013, http://www.prosci.com/main/adkar_overview.html.

⁷⁷ "ADKAR Change Management Model."

⁷⁸ Jeff Hiatt, *ADKAR: A Model for Change in Business, Government, and Our Community*, 1st ed (Loveland, Colorado: Prosci Learning Center Publications, 2006), 1.

The first category of the ADKAR Model is awareness. Hiatt states that it illustrates the individual's understanding of the nature of the change, why the change is being made, and the risk of not changing.⁷⁹ Hiatt uses the example of Pineapple growers in Ghana, and how they had to become aware of new food codes of practice were critical




Figure 5 ADKAR Change Model

Source: Taken from <http://www.change-management-coach.com/images/cmcadkar.jpg>, 3/20/13

to selling their goods in countries like the United Kingdom. Initially, farmers were resistant to the new practice, however, once they became aware of the nature of the change and why it was important, they understood the risks of not complying with the change. Awareness also takes into account the internal and external factors that lead an organization to have to change as well as the intended benefits of the change. Desire is the second category, and represents “the motivation and ultimate choice to support and participate in a change.”⁸⁰ This category focuses on the personal motivations for changing. These motivations will be as different as the individuals and organizations using the model. Using the pineapple example above, growers could not be forced to follow the new codes, but they were motivated by the risk of not being able to sell their crops if they did not change. The third category of knowledge represents the training and

⁷⁹ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 5.

⁸⁰ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 17.

education, the detailed information, and the understanding of the new roles and responsibilities necessary to know how to change.⁸¹ This part of the model can be very difficult. A simple process like changing how farmers handle crops may be simple. However, building the knowledge of how to change a sales strategy or transform an organization can be difficult. Individuals or organizations utilizing the ADKAR model will need to have the required knowledge about behaviors, processes, tools, systems, skills, job roles and techniques to implement the change.⁸² The fourth category to the model is ability, which represents the realization or execution of the change, which comes from turning the knowledge into action.⁸³ This stage is considered successfully completed when the individual or group demonstrates a capability to implement the change at the required performance level. The first three levels of awareness, desire, and knowledge provide the foundation for creating ability, but do not demonstrate the proficiency that is required with ability.⁸⁴ The fifth and final stage of the ADKAR model is reinforcement. This stage is designed to take into account the internal and external factors that will sustain the change and could include the external reinforcements like recognition or rewards that are tied to the realization of the change, or the internal reinforcements, such as personal satisfaction or other benefits derived from the change on a personal level.⁸⁵ The ADKAR lifecycle starts after the recognition of change is identified. From that point on, the model provides individuals and organizations with a framework and sequence for managing the change effort.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 23.

⁸² Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 2.

⁸³ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 31.

⁸⁴ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 31–32.

⁸⁵ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 37.

⁸⁶ Hiatt, *ADKAR*, 3.

Analyzing the three change models of Lewin, Kotter, and Hiatt presented above, numerous similarities transcend all three models. Figure 6 illustrates the similarities

Kurt Lewin	John Kotter
<i>Unfreeze</i>	1. Establish a Sense of Urgency 2. Create the Guiding Coalition 3. Develop a Vision and Strategy 4. Communicate the Change Vision
<i>Change</i>	5. Empower Broad-Based Action 6. Generate Short Term Wins 7. Consolidate Gains & Make More Change
<i>Refreeze</i>	8. Anchor New Approaches in the Culture

Figure 6 Comparison of Lewin and Kotter Change Models

Source: Robert Tanner, “Unfreeze, Change, Refreeze: Is This a Child’s Game?,” *Management is a Journey*, August 15, 2011, 1, <http://managementisajourney.com/2011/08/unfreeze-change-refreeze-is-this-a-childs-game/>.

between Lewin’s 3-stage approach and Dr. Kotter’s 8-Steps of Change. As the figure identifies, there is a direct correlation between Lewin’s three stages and Kotter’s steps. Similarly, there are strong correlations between Dr. Kotter’s eight steps and the ADKAR model. Dr. Kotter’s first two steps of increasing urgency and building the guiding team directly relate to the awareness stage of the ADKAR model. Kotter’s third and fourth steps of creating the vision and communicating for buy-in also directly relate to the desire stage of the ADKAR model. Kotter’s steps five and six, empowering action and creating short-term wins, have loose ties to the knowledge and ability stages of the ADKAR model, but do not correlate directly. Last, Kotter’s seventh and eighth steps of not letting

up and making change stick directly pertain to the reinforcement stage of the ADKAR model. It is not by accident that these models are so close. Kotter's 40 years of personal research and Hiatt's decade of aggressive research with Prosci, have compiled significant amounts of data points that reinforce what the fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science have been independently researching for years. The common factor between all of these change models is leadership. At some point in the change process, someone must become aware of the need for change, figure out how to describe it to themselves or others in a way that provides motivation to change, identify ways to implement the change, and then reinforce it until it sticks. Only one function can accomplish all of these tasks successfully... A Leader.

The Essence of Leadership in Change Management

As stated at the beginning of this paper, unmanaged change leads to chaos, chaos leads to inefficiency, and in resource-constrained environments, inefficiencies lead to failure. Quality leadership, educated in the principles of organizational behavior, and aware of factors that contribute to successful and unsuccessful change, can mean the difference between the success and failure of an organization. As Dr. Kotter points out, "The issue of leadership is centrally important here because leadership is different from management, and the primary force behind successful change is the former, not the latter. Without sufficient leadership, the probability of mistakes increases greatly and the probability of success decreases accordingly."⁸⁷ In 100% of the cases studied, major change began after a leader was selected to head the organization who had a track record

⁸⁷ Kotter, *What Leaders Really Do*, 10.

of leadership.⁸⁸ In Dr. Kotter's experience, "The single most visible factor that distinguishes major culture changes that succeed from those that fail is competent leadership at the top;" those individuals knew how to produce change, and were willing to do it.⁸⁹ Leaders are desperately needed to fulfill their organization's basic psychological needs. Without this key position, resistance to change and chaos will run rampant through the organization.

⁸⁸ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 84.

⁸⁹ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 84.

Chapter 4

Case Studies of the Total Force Initiative

Choosing the Case Studies

Across the Active Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves, there are currently 121 Total Force Initiative Associations as of 22 January 2013. This offers 121 potential case studies highlighting slightly different opportunities for research. The units selected as case studies for this paper include units based at Hill AFB, Pope Field, and Seymour-Johnson AFB. They were selected because of their contextual diversity prior to associating. Across the three bases, two units fall under the active association style, and one unit falls under the classic association style. In addition, the units at Hill AFB were chosen because they represented the first fighter unit to associate. The units at Pope Field were selected because of the large geographic distance the 440th Airlift Wing moved in order to associate with components of the 43rd Airlift Wing. The case study on units at Seymour-Johnson AFB was chosen due to the personnel constraints noted during the association process and the operational timeline associated with the change. Units were not selected from the Air Reserve Component association style mainly because that particular style has been discontinued. Senior leadership found there was not enough benefit to the Air Force Enterprise by having ARC units associating and competing for recruiting and funding.¹ These units were selected as case studies because they were the

¹ Information provided by Mr. Eric Pace, HAF/A8X

first units to associate and provide the best foundation to assess the change process as it was originally conceived.

The intent of analyzing these case studies is not to single out any individual, group, or organization to find fault or place blame. Nor is the intent to highlight mistakes that created setbacks or inefficiencies. The purpose of analyzing these case studies is to provide better awareness and education of how the principles of organizational behavior can be used to create efficiencies in future associations. Today's limited budgets and constrained resources creates a situation where the need to capitalize on efficiencies is imperative. The tools that the field of organizational behavior and the change management industry can provide to Air Force leaders, will enable them to be more successful and efficient, capitalizing on the benefits from change.

The Joint Lessons Learned Information System provided the after actions reports utilized to construct the case studies for this paper. Air Force Instruction 90-1601, *Air Force Lessons Learned Program*, manages the Air Force lessons learned program, and implements Air Force Policy Directive 90-16, *Air Force Studies, Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned*.² The program capitalizes on the knowledge and experiences of Airmen in an attempt to gain efficiencies in both combat capabilities and force readiness, and does it through a four-stage process known as the Air Force Lessons Process.³ Figure 7 below, illustrates the relationships between the four stages of collection, validation, dissemination, and resolution. The first stage of the process is the collection phase in which the AF/A9L shop collects potential lessons learned through push or pull methods. Once collected, subject matter experts validate potential lessons to ensure there

² "Air Force Instruction 90-1601, Air Force Lessons Learned Program" (United States Air Force, September 22, 2010), 1.

³ "AFI 90-1601," 2.

are identifiable lessons to process through the program. After validation, program managers disseminate lessons to organizations for action, ensuring the widest possible audiences of decision makers are informed. The last stage of the process is the resolution phase by which program managers staff potential lessons for action ensuring they become lessons learned and not lessons ignored or forgotten. Overall, the Air Force lessons




Figure 7 AF Lessons Process

Source: "AFI 90-1601," 3

learned program provides valuable information for units that have associated and will associate in the future. The program equips leaders with processes to help them to keep from making the same mistakes previously made.

388TH Fighter Wing and the 419TH Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT

On April 24, 2007, the Air Force Reserve's 419th Fighter Wing finalized its association with the Regular Air Force's 388th Fighter Wing at Hill AFB, UT, utilizing the model of a classic association. Initially announced by the Air Force in 2004, this process took about three years to come to fruition. Hill's association was one of six original test bases for the Total Force Integration initiative, and was the first fighter unit to go through the association process.⁴ The goals of this association were to enhance war-fighting capability, more efficiently utilize the available resources of the active and reserve units, and test the associate construct within the fighter community.⁵ One of the primary benefits of the association was the capabilities gained within the aircrew and maintenance specialties. The association allowed commanders to capitalize on the active duty's investment in training while exploiting the resident experience of the Reservists.⁶ As of 2007, the association was targeting the integration of aircrew and maintenance personnel. There were approximately 500 support personnel from the 419th FW that did not integrate with the RegAF 388th FW.⁷

Eight months after the formal association of the two units, Air Combat Command and the Air Force Reserve Command's A9L section came together to develop lessons learned from this association in an attempt to capture data to help with future associations. Teams dispersed to Hill AFB to interview key leaders from the wing, group, and squadron staffs in an effort to collect observations gained throughout the

⁴ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, "Got TFI? ACC/AFRC Hill TFI Collection. A9 Summary After Action Report," January 7, 2008, 1, <https://www.jllis.mil>.

⁵ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, "Got TFI," 1.

⁶ 419th and 388th FW Public Affairs Staff, "Hill Total Force Integration Signed into Action," *Air Force Reserve Command*, April 24, 2007, 1, www.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123050303.

⁷ 419th and 388th FW Public Affairs Staff, "Hill Total Force Integration Signed into Action," 1.

association process. The team divided the observations into the six major categories of Organizational Culture and Manpower, Direction and Policy, OPSTEMPO, TFI-Unit Designed Operational Capability (DOC), AEF Disconnects, and Facilities and Funding. There was an additional category added under the heading of Additional Observations to catch any findings that did not fit into the previous categories.

Organizational Culture played a major role in the association of the 419th and 388th Fighter Wings.⁸ Although both units already shared the same base prior to the association, each unit came equipped with a well-established heritage, identity, operating norms, and organizational culture. For shops with pre-existing relationships spanning the two units, leadership found the association to be easier than it was for shops with no pre-association relationships. In addition, unit identity became a problem for members of the 419th FW's maintenance personnel. The new organizational structure created by the association took their maintainers out of their Aircraft Maintenance Unit (AMU) and dispersed them across the three AMUs of the 388th FW. Although this organizational format could be more efficient, the perceived loss of identity by the 419th maintainers could affect productivity. From a manpower perspective, Reservists faced additional problems stemming from labor union constraints, civilian classification issues, and problems revolving around the locally-managed retention, recruiting, and volunteerism rates.

Given the constraints and conflicts from an organizational culture and manpower perspective, leadership between the two units at Hill felt the key to bridging the cultural divide rested in strategic messaging early in the process ensuring all personnel

⁸ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, "Got TFI," 3.

understood how each component functioned.⁹ The after action report recommended the education of all personnel within both units, with a focus on the similarities and differences of the units. Leadership felt better communication upfront would help to minimize confusion associated with organizational structure and responsibilities. Overall, leadership needed to develop a more detailed organizational model or structure for the association in order to facilitate a better understanding of the final product.¹⁰

Within the category of Direction and Policy, observers noted similar issues of identifying a clear and defined vision. In the report, the teams highlighted that “there was no clear/detailed vision of what the classic association should look like at the end of Phase III on which to focus planning.”¹¹ This lack of vision also led to other problems associated with higher headquarters policies and direction. Without a clear understanding of what the final product would look like, unit leadership felt confused in how to deal with discrepancies between MAJCOMs regarding the flying hour program, safety down days, and training days. Both units were in need of senior leadership at all levels to define and communicate OPDIR and ADCON and communicate how these related throughout the organizations.¹²

The section on operations tempo highlighted a major variable in the TFI process centering on deployments. Air Expeditionary Force Taskings are mandatory for Regular AF members whereas Reserve and Guard members fall under a voluntary standard. Reserve and Guard taskings are voluntary mainly because of an attempt to balance the needs of the military as well as the civilian employers of the Guard and Reserve

⁹ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, “Got TFI,” 3.

¹⁰ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, “Got TFI,” 4.

¹¹ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, “Got TFI,” 5.

¹² ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, “Got TFI,” 5.

members. Many of the Guard and Reserve forces were Traditional members, meaning they were part-time members of the unit and served one weekend per month and two weeks per year. Their full-time employment was in the local community. The more time they spent tasked full-time with their Guard or Reserve unit, the more time they were away from their primary jobs. If over-tasked by their units for temporary duty or deployments, it could have drastic effects on the unit's retention. The mandatory versus volunteer taskings between the active and reserve forces also affected the retention of the active duty members. As they saw the volunteer taskings on the reserve side, it had the potential to cause members to leave the active component for the reserve component causing problems down the road for the active duty unit.

In addition, Regular AF members received taskings on a 16-month AEF training cycle whereas the Reserve forces received taskings based on a 20-month training cycle.¹³ At Hill AFB, the difference of volunteer versus mandatory and the disparity between cycles caused additional stress points within the organization. In order to mitigate these disparities, senior leaders within the ARC components must determine a reasonable tasking rate in order to balance the higher operations tempo with volunteerism rates and task their units appropriately. Senior leaders in the Regular AF chain of command must take into account the appropriate tasking rate of associated ARC units and either increase the personnel manning in the active component or reduce taskings accordingly to mitigate problems.

Problems continued to be highlighted in the areas of the TFI-unit Designed Operational Capabilities and AEF disconnect categories of the report due to personnel

¹³ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, "Got TFI," 7.

constraints.¹⁴ In both sections, reserve volunteerism rates called into question the accuracy of deployment packages relying on a specified percentage of volunteer manning. Within the case study, team recommendations were to determine steady-state and surge capabilities for associated units based on long-term reasonable reserve volunteerism rates. This would provide an accurate picture of expected manpower allowing leaders to task units appropriately.

The last category of facilities and funding provided insight into sticking points with the TFI model. The integration of units into single facilities created problems discussed earlier with cultural identity and heritage. Part of the benefits of associating units is to gain the efficiencies offered with downsizing the number of facilities required on a base. Each facility carries sunk costs covering the building costs and the costs of maintaining and operating the facility. The less space units require, the lower the costs are for the base. However, leaders must help individuals through the change process when major portions of their identity and daily lives are directly affected. This is one area where the change management industry can provide insight. Leaders who are knowledgeable about organizational behavior principles can utilize their skills to help rebuild unit culture and identity quicker. Chapter 5 discusses this topic in greater detail.

440TH Airlift Wing and the 43RD Airlift Wing, Pope AFB, NC

Prior to 2007, the 440th Airlift Wing was located at General Mitchell Air Reserve Station in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) recommended the closure of General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, sending the

¹⁴ ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, “Got TFI,” 8.

440th Airlift Wing to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and dispersing four of its eight C-130H aircraft to the 94th Airlift Wing at Dobbins Air Reserve Station, and four to the 314th Airlift Wing at Little Rock Air Force Base.¹⁵ Early in 2007, the 440th AW moved to Pope Air Force Base sharing the base with the 43rd Airlift Wing. The 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron of the 43rd Airlift Wing and the 2nd Airlift Squadron (part of the 43rd AW) became an active association with the Air Force Reserve's 440th Airlift Wing. The flag of the 440th Airlift Wing officially transferred to Pope Air Field on June 10, 2007, and the unit conducted its first unit training assembly five months later.¹⁶ Because of BRAC law, the 440th Airlift Wing became the first active associate unit in Air Force history.¹⁷ A little over a year after the transition and association, both components deployed assets in support of OIF requiring intense teamwork and an integrated focus. To ensure leadership captured accurate and detailed lessons learned from this association, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Mobility Command, and 22 Air Force formed a team in 2008 to research and assemble an After Action Report

Similar to the Hill AFB case study, the goals of this association were to enhance war-fighting capabilities and increase efficiencies of available resources. The two teams comprised of members from AFRC, AMC, and Second AF conducted personal interviews with key staff members from the wing, group, and squadron levels in order to capture a holistic view of the association from every level. For purposes of organization, the after action report was divided up into the ten major headings of guidance, end state,

¹⁵ Chairman Principi, Anthony J., "2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report," .gov, *Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission*, September 8, 2005, 170, <http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/BRACReportcomplete.pdf>.

¹⁶ "Pope Field," *Factsheets: History of the 440th Airlift Wing*, April 15, 2009, <http://www.pope.afrc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3696>.

¹⁷ "Pope Field."

leadership, facilities, SATAF, agreements, culture, personnel, material, and integration. It is important to highlight the pertinent information from each of these sections to illustrate the full picture for the case study. Each section captures an important piece of the association and offers material to analyze the efficiency of leadership throughout the change process.

The lessons learned teams found through personal interviews from both units that written guidance for the association was inadequate.¹⁸ The teams defined this guidance as “statutory BRAC language, applicable AFIs, the AMC/AFRC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Active Associate Units and Addendum, Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs), Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), and other formal and/or informal written agreements.”¹⁹ Adding to the complexity, the association process introduced unit members to a new vernacular. Air Force Instruction 90-1001 states that in all three types of association structures, whether active, classic, or air reserve component, “units retain command of their own forces and separate organizational structures.”²⁰ In order to accomplish unified leadership by associated unit commanders though two or more separate organizational structures, leadership created the idea of Operational Direction (OPDIR). Although it follows the same lines of Operational Control (OPCON), it brought about questions as to whether it was a type of OPCON or if it was a subset of OPCON. OPDIR also created confusion because it sounded like other terms such as Administrative Control (ADCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) but was not a formally recognized command authority and should not have been used outside the context of AFI

¹⁸ “AFRC/AMC/22 AF Pope TFI Collection Summary After Action Report,” December 16, 2008, 2.

¹⁹ “Pope TFI Collection,” 7.

²⁰ “AFI 90-1001,” 7.

90-1001.²¹ Overall, frustration occurred because both units felt the guidance was vague, incomplete, or contradictory to other references, and was open to interpretation creating further complications.²²

The lack of clarity in guidance also stemmed from a lack of vision for the end state of the organization causing problems with timing and communications. The lessons learned team found that leadership from both units lacked consensus in understanding the association and its construct.²³ Lack of a clear end state also contributed to confusion because different organizations internal and external to the association were utilizing different timelines. The ramp up of the Reserve organization did not match the drawdown within the RegAF unit causing manpower shortfalls in operations and maintenance.²⁴ Adding to the stress, the associated units began receiving taskings prior to establishing their key processes.²⁵ External to the association of the 440th AW and the 43rd AW, the BRAC actions involving Ft. Bragg that would eventually change Pope AFB to Pope Field created problems with facility assignments and the assignment of functional responsibilities.²⁶ As of 2011, five AF major commands had units operating at Pope Field, and responsibility for base functions were still transferring between the 43rd AW and the 440th AW.²⁷ A clear end state was desperately required to enable units to finish the beddown process and begin working efficiently as an associated unit.

The lessons learned team also identified the criticality of leadership in the association process. Initially, a ten-person team assigned to Detachment 1 at Pope tried

²¹ "AFI 90-1001," 8.

²² "Pope TFI Collection," 7.

²³ "Pope TFI Collection," 9.

²⁴ "Pope TFI Collection," 10.

²⁵ "Pope TFI Collection," 9.

²⁶ "Pope TFI Collection," 10.

²⁷ Paraglide, "Fort Bragg Takes Over Pope Air Force Base Under BRAC," February 25, 2011, <http://www.army.mil/article/52441/>.

to accomplish the various association tasks as efficiently as possible. However, AFSC and skill level or experience kept them from being able to accomplish the necessary tasks to stand up the new unit.²⁸ The 10-person team did not understand the full scope of creating logistic readiness and manpower programs.²⁹ The lack of appropriate guidance in the original CONOPS and lack of pertinent leadership allowed personnel from the MAJCOM and AFPC level down to the base-level units to operate within their respective scopes while operating on their own timelines.

Communication issues, lack of leadership oversight, and lack of an end-state vision also led to facility constraints for the 440th AW during the standup process at Pope Field. Facility problems included square footage issues stemming from insufficient allocated space compared to what was required and authorized per regulations. The cramped conditions caused undo frustration on the part of the 440th AW and the 43rd AW.³⁰ The ensuing chaos led to frustration and inefficiencies throughout the association process. The end-state vision should have pre-identified where units would work based on their authorized footprints so units could move and start working as soon as possible.

The SATAF section of the report primarily addressed the problem of confusion over Base Operating Support (BOS) functions not clearly identified during previous SATAF meetings. The lack of clarity in guidance and vision, and the confusion regarding the BRAC law concerning Pope AFB and Fort Bragg, created problems in identifying which unit would provide BOS functions such as network support or flightline security. The lessons learned team identified the need to adjust, close, update, and publish SATAF action items in real time as POCs worked the issues to ensure good

²⁸ "Pope TFI Collection," 11.

²⁹ "Pope TFI Collection," 11.

³⁰ "Pope TFI Collection," 12.

communications at all levels and ensure leadership had an accurate picture of the situation. If leadership had identified the end-state during the SATAF, the SATAF team could have accounted for many of the MOAs and MOUs required for efficient operations at the beginning of the association. In addition, if Fort Bragg's BRAC issues had been made clear to the SATAF team, the potential to build Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSAs) ahead of time would have been possible.

As noted earlier, Fort Bragg's BRAC issues with Pope AFB complicated the association between the 440th and 43rd Air Wings. Further, the merger with Ft. Bragg drove the requirement to have substantial agreements to include ISSAs between the 440th and the 43rd Air Wings, and Ft. Bragg. In addition, the Host Tenant Support Agreement (HTSA) was not final at the time of the after action report due to two key areas: Lack of an end state laying out which wing would be the host, and a lack of functional points of contact to review and provide inputs to the agreement.³¹ Active involvement of leadership from all units involved providing strategic vision for the end state could have negated much of the confusion had these processes been walked through prior to the beginning of the association.

The diversity of each unit's background contributed significant challenges to building a new unified culture within the newly associated units at Pope Field. In order to overcome these challenges, the lessons learned team identified the need to educate the units involved in each other's roles, responsibilities, and policies. A comprehensive review of strengths and challenges of operating within each other's environment would help build an overall understanding. It is important that individuals "recognize, acknowledge, educate, and embrace the cultural differences which exist between the

³¹ "Pope TFI Collection," 14.

Reserve and Regular Components.”³² The sooner these organizations could meet and begin learning about each other, the sooner the culture-building process would begin.

The Base Closure and Realignment Commission moved the 440th Airlift Wing over 900 miles from Milwaukee, WI to Fayetteville, NC. This put an enormous stress on the full and part-time members of the unit that were able to make the move, and significantly impacted the unit’s retention rate. Once established at Pope Field, the 440th had only retained 24 percent of its original members leaving a small core cadre to rebuild the unit.³³ Additionally, the report cited 40 percent of the new enlisted force was comprised of one and three skill levels taxing unit trainers. Adding to the complexity of the association, the 440th was responsible for activating the unit at the new location and deactivating the unit at the old location within close succession. These time and manpower-intensive actions required knowledgeable personnel at both locations, which proved challenging due to the significant reduction in manning from the move. The remaining leadership for the 440th AW had to be involved in many different tasks simultaneously in order to make the association successful. Better guidance and leadership from higher headquarters, and an end state with greater clarity could have increased efficiencies freeing up desperately needed manpower at all levels.

The material section of the after action report pertained to the challenges associated with Unit Training Assembly (UTA) weekends. Many members utilized airlift shuttles to travel to and from drill weekends, creating a large demand for lodging and transportation at the unit. The drawdown of the 43rd Air Wing’s equipment and the transfer of the base to the Army stressed the already-scarce resources available to

³² “Pope TFI Collection,” 15.

³³ “Pope TFI Collection,” 16.

members of the 440th attending UTAs. This provided leadership with another challenge to overcome through MOUs, MOAs, or within the HTSA.

The last section of the report pertained to the integration efforts of the two airlift wings. The specific BRAC language referred only to the association between the 440th Airlift Wing, the 2nd Airlift Squadron, and the 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron.³⁴ This caused confusion among the leadership as to how to integrate the other functional areas. In most cases, shop leadership took the initiative to co-locate where possible and establish written agreements where necessary to cover taskings in case of shortfalls.³⁵ These challenges again highlighted the need for prior planning by those controlling the association processes to create an end-state vision before the association took place to help smooth transitions and allow for prior planning and building of written agreements ahead of time. Any efforts to ease confusion and frustration during change make the change process easier and more efficient for all involved.

The lessons learned teams concluded the report with a recommendations and way forward section that stepped through the importance of the after action report effort and how it aligned with the Air Force Lessons Learned Program. Air Force Reserve Command, 22nd Air Force, and Air Mobility Command's A9L shop were listed as the agencies responsible to manage and track the observations and lessons identified in the report using the AF lessons learned program.

³⁴ "Pope TFI Collection," 20.

³⁵ "Pope TFI Collection," 20.

911TH Air Refueling Squadron and the 916TH Air Refueling Wing

The final case study for this paper outlines the active association between the AFRC's 916th Air Refueling Wing and the RegAF's 911th Air Refueling Squadron. Similar to the previous two case studies, the 2005 BRAC law played a key role in creating the association between these two units. The 2005 BRAC report required the realignment of the 319th Air Refueling Wing at Grand Forks AFB, ND, and the distribution of eight of its KC-135R aircraft to Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC.³⁶ The transferred aircraft when added to ones currently stationed at Seymour-Johnson AFB with the Reserve's 916th ARW brought the total aircraft count to 16.³⁷ The goals of the association were to enhance war-fighting capability and more efficiently utilize available resources.³⁸ The active association of the 911th ARS with the 916th ARW marked the first tanker active associate unit in the Reserve Command.³⁹ Essentially, the 911th ARS moved over 1600 miles due to decisions stemming from BRAC law. Although this move was similar to the move of the 440th Airlift Wing from Wisconsin to North Carolina, the 911th ARS did not have the same complications stemming from part-time members working in, and unable to move from, the local community.

The commander of the 911th ARS created the lessons learned report for the active association of the 911th ARS and the 916th ARW, which received final approval on 6 July 2009. In the report, he focused on operational hurdles and effects on the day-to-day

³⁶ Chairman Principi, Anthony J., "2005 BRAC Report," 151.

³⁷ Senior Airman Brandon Rizzo, "BRAC Changes on the Horizon for North Carolina Refueling Wing," .mil, *Air Force Reserve Command*, September 6, 2007, 1, <http://www.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123067049>.

³⁸ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th Air Refueling Squadron Active Associate Stand-up Lessons Learned Report" (USAF, July 6, 2009), 7.

³⁹ Senior Airman Brandon Rizzo, "BRAC Changes on the Horizon for North Carolina Refueling Wing," 1.

missions, quality-of-life issues, the differences between the planned and actual stand up, the chains of command, MOUs and MOAs, guidance, cultures, the DOC statements, and BOS functions.

Starting with the operational hurdles and their effects on the day-to-day mission accomplishments, the commander noted the two largest operational hurdles were a “lack of sufficient MAJCOM guidance concerning establishment of the Active Associate unit, and the hasty and disorganized manner in which AFPC flowed personnel to the 911 ARS during the summer of 2008.”⁴⁰ Members of both units found the BRAC language as well as guidance coming from Air Force instructions, and the AMC/AFRC CONOPS to be lacking in the specificity required to make the association run smoothly. “The guidance was often vague, incomplete, and/or contradictory to other references.”⁴¹ Throughout the wing, there was a lack of consensus on end-state vision, which affected the timelines for association and hampered efforts to utilize milestones to reach the end state efficiently. Similar to Pope Field, OPDIR was confusing creating constant discussions of commander’s intent and chain of command issues.⁴²

The lack of a clear end-state vision and milestone roadmap created problems with aircraft and personnel as well. The CONOPS plan did not include a deliberate or methodical plan laying out the ideal flow of inbound personnel or aircraft. The resulting large influx of untrained personnel with early aircraft transfers adversely affected the day-to-day operations of the newly associated units. Aircraft transfers were the result of BRAC decisions and they arrived early to Seymour-Johnson AFB because of accelerated closures and drawdowns at other units. The personnel influxes resulted from the

⁴⁰ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 2.

⁴¹ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 7.

⁴² Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 8.

deactivation of the 911th ARS at Grand Forks in June of 2007 and the reactivation at Seymour-Johnson AFB the following April.⁴³ The rapid influx of personnel over-taxed the maintenance and operations trainers available to get new personnel current in their job requirements. The combination of untrained maintenance personnel and early aircraft transfers to the unit created significant negative impacts on the unit's mission capability rates.

The rapid influx of personnel also created some quality-of-life issues for members of the 911th ARS. The 4th Fighter Wing is the host unit for Seymour-Johnson AFB, and provides services to the Reserve 916th Air Refueling Wing. With the massive influx of junior-grade members, it was necessary to house the Airmen in dormitories that while adequate, did not meet the current AF standards.⁴⁴ Further complicating the problem, the 4th FW was in the process of privatizing its base housing, which reduced the availability from 1700 units down to approximately 900 units.⁴⁵ Fortunately, the local community was able to absorb the rapid influx of personnel and all personnel in need were able to find housing.

Many of the problems discussed so far are the result of timing issues. The section of the report pertaining to the plan versus the implementation speaks further to either the poor communication or poor execution of the plan by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC).⁴⁶ The initial ADVON team created by AFPC lacked the two key positions of a first sergeant and a maintenance officer. The void in filling these two positions diverted the attention of the superintendent away from other areas of responsibility such as

⁴³ Senior Airman Brandon Rizzo, "BRAC Changes on the Horizon for North Carolina Refueling Wing," 1.

⁴⁴ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 9.

⁴⁵ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 9.

⁴⁶ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 10.

establishing critical maintenance integration programs and providing for the basic needs of the squadron's airmen. The CONOPS developed by AMC and AFRC called for maximum integration, but failed to provide adequate guidance for how the units should be integrated and did not take into account the rank imbalance between the active duty and reserve personnel. Without proactive leadership, the imbalance in rank, especially among the maintenance personnel, potentially could have unintended consequences on career progression, especially on the RegAF members.

The integration of RegAF leadership into the Reserve chain of command made great progress in sending the integration message to both of the newly associated units. Within the Maintenance Group specifically, the commander selected the RegAF CMSgt as the MXG's superintendent. This decision proved pivotal to integration as RegAF personnel had leadership representation at the Group level, and Reserve personnel received the message that integration would happen at all levels.⁴⁷ This action also helped with clarifying problems encountered between the conflicting guidance of AMC and Reserve regulations and policies. With the integrated leadership at the group level, conflicts could be elevated to the appropriate level and decisions could be resolved cooperatively between the two units. Even with integrated chains of command however, the units still struggled with the concept and employment of OPDIR. Commander's intent and OPDIR required repeated explanation partly because of the rapid influx of new personnel, and partly because OPDIR was a new term not fully understood by many people within the organizations.

⁴⁷ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 11.

As discussed at the beginning of the case study, unit leadership found the guidance for the active association “woefully inadequate in clarity and detail.”⁴⁸ In October of 2007, AFPC began forming the ADVON team that would establish the 911th ARS at Seymour-Johnson AFB. At that time, the 916th ARW and the 6 AMW were only aware of the CONOPS for active associate units and the Cheyenne CONOPS.⁴⁹ This limited knowledge made their leadership leery of entering into binding MOUs and MOAs without a good end-state vision provided by the MAJCOM. To overcome this, local leadership between the 916th ARW and 911th ARS discussed and verbally agreed to a mutually desirable end state. The Organization’s leadership eventually put in place a memorandum of agreement that solidified verbal agreements and completed the links in the guidance of AFI 90-1001, the addendum to AFI 90-1001, which was still in MAJCOM coordination, and the local MOU.⁵⁰

After the association, there was still a need for additional guidance from higher headquarters. Maintenance regulations from AFRC required a certain amount of time in a skill level in addition to rank requirements for upgrade whereas RegAF regulations only called for skill level requirements. When units faced these types of disparities, leadership decided to follow the more restrictive guidance. However, this may have negatively affected the RegAF maintenance personnel if they had deployed with other AMC personnel, as they would not possess the same skill sets as their counterparts.⁵¹

As with the focus on guidance, the report highlighted that leadership must be aware of the importance of building an organization’s culture. It stated that it was vital to

⁴⁸ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 12.

⁴⁹ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 12.

⁵⁰ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 12.

⁵¹ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 13.

the success of the association to ensure that units involved with the association had an understanding and appreciation of what all the units did, the capabilities they provided, and how they fit into the new organization. The report suggested that leadership should ensure that units met early on in the association process to educate each other on their capabilities and contributions to the new organization. Higher headquarters can affect this process as well by selecting commanders with previous experience either working with or leading associated units.⁵²

The relative newness of TFI created additional problems for units because they did not have any models to look to or follow. As such, the active association faced challenges with DOC statements and SORTS/ART reporting procedures during their active association process. One of the many hurdles faced was building a ‘personnel only’ Unit Type Code (UTC) for flying units. This was something new across the Air Force and it caused several delays at the MAJCOM level. Timing proved to be a problem for creating the 911th ARS DOC statement. Air Force Instruction 90-1001 requires that unit DOC statements be aligned with Unified Combatant Command OPLANs and that host and associate units train to meet the Combatant Commander’s stated mission requirements.⁵³ At the time of association, the 916th ARW was in the process of rewriting their DOC statement, causing a delay in the writing of the 911th ARS DOC statement because the two needed to be in alignment for sharing equipment in order to meet the AFI requirement.

Deficient guidance also created problems with SORTS/ART reporting. At the time of association, there was no MAJCOM guidance provided directing how associated

⁵² Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 14.

⁵³ “AFI 90-1001,” 14.

units would report Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) or Air and Space Expeditionary UTC Reporting Tool (ART) information.⁵⁴ The latest version of AFI 90-1001 available on the Air Force e-publishing website dated 29 May 2007, states, “Units or designated OPRs will be responsible to report unit status to their respective MAJCOM/NGB through standard DRRS/SORTS/ART reporting tools and in accordance with established guidance and current AFIs as supplemented.”⁵⁵ Questions between ADCON and OPDIR drove confusion as to whether the 916th ARW was to report because of OPDIR and readiness tasking under AFI 90-1001, or if the 6th AMW was responsible because of ADCON. In the void of higher headquarters guidance, unit leadership felt it best that the 6th AMW provide oversight for SORTS/ART reporting.

The last section of the lessons learned report pertained to the Host Base Operating Support (BOS) functions. As the Host unit for Seymour-Johnson AFB, the 4th Fighter Wing provided other units on base with BOS functions. As such, the 916th ARW and the 911th ARS relied upon the 4th FW to provide for First Term Airmen Center, Airmen Leadership School, Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy requirements.⁵⁶ System integrity and integration issues between AMC and ACC systems created problems for unit POCs managing Personnel Accounting Symbol (PAS) codes. When the 911th ARS stood up, it was designated with a PAS code for Seymour-Johnson. System restrictions within the Military Personnel Flight system blocked the 6th AMW at MacDill AFB (the parent wing) from gaining visibility into the 911th ARS to see or track training, inbound or outbound personnel,

⁵⁴ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 14.

⁵⁵ “AFI 90-1001,” 20.

⁵⁶ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 15.

promotion data, and other pertinent information.⁵⁷ Information had to be passed from the 4th FW and the 916th ARW to keep the 6th AMW informed. Further, problems centered around the ACC firewall procedures and incompatible SharePoint protocols, restricted the flow of information amongst the different units. In order to capitalize on the efficiencies inherent in these associations, leadership needed to address these restrictions in the critical information systems.

The lessons learned report concluded with a section providing a way forward or recommendations from the association process. Capitalizing on the Air Force Lessons Learned Program, identified problems with the active association of the 916th ARW and the 911th ARS proceeded through the four-stage process with the goal of becoming lessons learned. Between the 6th AMW, the 916th ARW, AFRC, and AMC/AA9L, POCs managed and tracked observations and lessons identified through the lessons learned program.

⁵⁷ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., “AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report,” 15.

Chapter 5 –

Putting It All Together... The So What Factor

Total Force Integration is the way of the foreseeable future for the United States Air Force. Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of TFI and why the Air Force is investing time, money, and resources into making the transition. Chapter 3 provided the background behind the study of organizational behavior and illustrated several change management models currently utilized within the commercial sector. Chapter 4 walked through three independent case studies reflecting problems faced by units following BRAC and Air Force instructions. The intent of this chapter is to integrate the information from the previous three chapters into something that leaders can utilize to help the association process become more efficient and capitalize on these inherent efficiencies in a shorter amount of time.

Anyone can pick up an After Action Report or pull a document from the Lessons Learned Information System. Reading through these individual after action reports or lessons learned reports helps familiarize and educate leaders in the individual issues faced by the specific units in the report. However, it is only through the process of analyzing multiple case studies that one can identify bigger-picture problems. The vital link is learning how to turn the knowledge gained through analysis into an action that capitalizes on the desired effects. Gaining efficiencies in Total Force Integrations requires leaders to capitalize on the knowledge of organizational behavior put into action through utilization of change management models and the principles.


Analysis of the three case studies presented in this paper draws attention to three basic themes revolving around insufficient guidance, a lack of an end-state vision, and a deficiency in higher headquarters leadership oversight standardizing the standup of new associations. All three of these areas affect the efficiency of the units involved and the larger Air Force organization in a significant way. The primary goals of each association studied were to enhance war-fighting capabilities and more efficiently utilize available resources.¹ Insufficient guidance that creates chaos and confusion, a lack of strategic vision clarifying the desired end state of the organization, and the lack of higher leadership oversight all contribute to major inefficiencies that can last for years affecting all levels of the Air Force organization. This chaos reduces overall efficiencies rather than helping units capitalize on the efficiencies desired by associating in the first place. If leaders do not deliberately and proactively manage change, units will find themselves working backwards in their goals to become more efficient. Such failure in today's fiscal austerity could have long-lasting effects with severe repercussions in national security.

Building new associated organizations starts with effectively stepping through the change process starting with the highest-level organization first. Once the change has successfully occurred and units achieve stability in their new organizations, leaders can utilize principles of Organizational Behavior to help solidify the changes and develop new culture, identity, and norms. Leaders at all levels can use these principles and techniques to roll back the effects of unhealthy behaviors stemming from organizational change. The goal of this section is to demonstrate how today's formal and informal leaders can use the principles described earlier in this paper to increase the efficiencies of

¹ "Pope TFI Collection," 5; Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 7; ACC & AFRC A9L Collection Team, "Got TFI," 1.

current and future TFI associations utilizing the three major themes highlighted by the case studies as points of reference. As an aside, it is important to note that since these first associations took place, senior leaders have gained valuable experience and knowledge through programs like the Air Force Lessons Learned Program and through participating first-hand in associations themselves. However, these leaders will be more effective when they combine their experience with the study of human behaviors in order to gain a greater understanding of the link between leadership and the change process.

Overlaying Dr. Kotter's 8-steps of change model with the three themes of the case studies illustrates the importance of leadership in the TFI change process. As figure 8



■ Kotter, John P. and Cohen, Dan S. The Heart of Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press

Figure 8 Kotter's Eight Steps of Change

Source: Kotter, John P. and Cohen, Dan S. The Heart of Change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press

recaps below, the first three steps of the model aid leaders in creating a climate for change within the organization. The 2005 BRAC decisions provided the impetus for step one. In the presented case studies, BRAC law set and increased the urgency of the transformation. Although senior leaders in the military and Air Force reviewed and approved the BRAC decisions, the commission's actions provided leadership from the local level to higher headquarters with the necessary motivation required to start the change process. However, sometimes the BRAC law created situations where the second step of the process was more difficult to execute effectively. In the case of Pope Field where the 440th moved a great distance to associate, BRAC law created a situation where unit leadership could not sufficiently build the guiding team to drive the change process. The after action teams found that "many of the personnel needed to facilitate a smooth association were not hired and/or in place" to do so.² The case study for Seymour-Johnson also highlighted a similar point with the absence of a maintenance officer and first sergeant from the ADVON team. This deficiency diverted the attention of the superintendent from standing up the association to providing for the basic necessities of the squadron's airmen.³ Not having the right people in place to build the guiding team for the change effort generated significant effects on the rest of the entire change process. In particular, not having a good guiding team hampered the efforts for step three of the model, setting the right vision. All three of the case studies shared common problems with visualizing what the organization would look like after the association was complete, which created ripple effects throughout the transformation.

² "Pope TFI Collection," 3.

³ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 10.

Looking at this situation through the organizational behavior lens, Dr. Kotter's research found that "people who have been through difficult, painful, and not very successful change efforts often end up drawing both pessimistic and angry conclusions. They become suspicious of the motives of those pushing for transformation; they worry that major change is not possible without carnage; they fear that the boss is a monster or that much of management is incompetent."⁴ The potential outcome from a failed or difficult association is the creation of unit members who become difficult to lead through the rest of the transformation or through later change efforts. The more that resistance builds against the leader because of change, the more that leader will have to use organizational behavior techniques to regain control.

After Action Reports and observations pulled from the Air Force Lessons Learned Information System tend not to highlight the behaviors of individuals. Instead, they focus on higher-level issues that usually stem from the behaviors of individuals. Four sets of underlying behaviors commonly stop or hinder the change process: complacency, immobilization, deviance, and hesitation.⁵ Complacency can stem from a false pride or arrogance, whereas immobilization can be a result of panic or fear that drives an individual into a feeling of self-protection. If people do not agree with a leader's vision for change, they may react with deviance toward the action. Lastly, a pessimistic attitude can lead individuals to hesitate on making or supporting a change event. Although the reports did not single out individuals exemplifying this behavior, my personal experience shows that leaders will have to deal with these behaviors at some time during a major transformation. Organizational leaders or members of the guiding team must be able to

⁴ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 17.

⁵ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, 17.

recognize the symptoms of these behaviors quickly so they do not derail the entire change event. Changing behavior is about identifying and speaking to the emotions and feelings of individuals.⁶ Speaking to an individual's emotions will help them succeed through the transformation. Often times, individuals will feel more secure once they have a clear vision of the future organization.

Lacking a clear vision of the new organization can also affect the ability of senior and local leaders to develop guidance shaping the new organization. In the case of the 916th ARW and the 911th ARS, the lack of a clearly understood end state amongst leaders at all levels drove a 'work in progress' mentality that kept the association in a constant state of flux. Leadership between the two units had to create integration wherever possible in the absence of clear and detailed MAJCOM guidance.⁷ The constant state of flux affected the next phase of the change process as well where leaders try to enable and engage the entire organization.

Step four of Dr. Kotter's change model deals with communicating buy-in throughout the organization. This is challenging when unit leadership cannot explain or define what the organization will look like when it is complete. If individuals do not know the direction of the organization, it is difficult for them to make productive contributions and buy in to the change process. Looking at Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, the basic needs of an individual revolve around physiological and safety needs.⁸ A major part of the safety needs comes from the stability of feeling secure and safe in one's employment. The constant flux of feeling your way through an association creates an environment where people become unsure of where they will be working tomorrow,

⁶ Kotter and Cohen, *The Heart of Change*, X.

⁷ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 3.

⁸ "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs."

where they fit in the organization, and if they will still have a job. Leaders need to provide stability to their employees by being able to reassure them and help them to understand what the end state of change will be.

The example of the 916th ARW's Maintenance Group Commander provides a great example of how to create buy-in to change throughout the organization. Partly because of retirements within the group of Reserve chiefs, and partly because of the need to integrate, the Maintenance Group Commander selected the RegAF maintenance chief from the 911th ARS to fill the Group Superintendent position.⁹ This single action instantly gave RegAF personnel a connection to the leadership and demonstrated the end-state vision that integration would take place at all levels throughout the new organization. The placement of the RegAF Chief into the Reserve Group's Superintendent position exemplified the vision of integration, and provided both the RegAF and Reserve personnel with representation and solidarity in the leadership of the new organization. Suddenly, all levels of the organization understood that change was going to take place, which helped the organization progress to the fifth level of the model, the aim to empower action. Seeing the integration in upper levels of leadership enabled leaders at the lower level to push the integration throughout the organization. Without the solidarity at the top, there is more apprehension to push change at lower levels.

Once individuals within the organization understand the change and develop a gut-level commitment, leaders must address the barriers that block the masses from taking action. Unit members must feel empowered to help create the change. The reduction in resistance to the change allows unit leadership to focus on the last three steps

⁹ Uptmore, Lt Col William K., "AFRC/AMC/911th ARS Lessons Learned Report," 3.

of the change model, which help solidify the change and make it stick. All three of the major themes pulled from the analysis of the case studies pertain to the first four or five steps of Dr. Kotter's change model. Building the guiding team and creating the right vision for the change take care of the end state of the new organization and allow the right guidance to be developed and distributed before the change event occurs. The building of the guiding team also aids in providing the unitary leadership oversight of the change effort.

Over roughly the past decade, the HAF A/8 shop has become the over-arching guiding team for Air Force transformations. By developing and managing change through programs such as the Air Force Lessons Learned Information System and through After Action Reports, the A8 shop has been able to provide better guidance and standardization for operational level leaders stepping through the change process. The strategic level of leadership can utilize the first steps of Kotter's change model to initiate change and select the guiding team; however, as we will see later, these principles and models are the most hard-hitting at the operational and tactical levels of leadership.

Similar to Dr. Kotter's change model, the ADKAR model developed by Jeff Hiatt and the Prosci group is just as applicable to the themes found within the case studies. Similar to step one of the eight-step model, the BRAC law developed the *Awareness* of the need for change. The BRAC law forced units to make the necessary changes to follow the law and forced unit leaders and members to be aware of the change about to take place within their organizations. The second step of the ADKAR model focuses on the development of the *Desire* to support and participate in the change. Again, the BRAC law was purposeful in directing who would change and when. In this situation,

the desire to change was forced from above and unit leaders did not have to work hard to show why the change needed to take place. The third step of the ADKAR model, however, is where problems in the Air Force change process start to become evident. Ensuring units were *knowledgeable* about how to implement the change was problematic. Leaders from all units did the best they could with the information and knowledge they had available to them. Each case study report highlights upfront the outstanding efforts of the team members in making the associations happen. Often times, units achieved great successes within a year or two of standing up the new organizations, even though they lacked the knowledge of how best to implement major transformations. The point is, units can increase their efficiencies sooner by minimizing problems associated with end state vision and guidance problems through giving their leaders the *Ability* to implement change. Knowledge and ability to change comes through education based on proven researched and validated change processes created through the study of Organizational Behavior and Change Management. Prior to implementing major transformations, senior leaders within the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve should ensure the leaders in charge of the transformation effort are educated in these principles confirming they have the required knowledge and ability to accomplish the task. The last step of the ADKAR model is *Reinforcement*. As with all change efforts, if the new culture or organizational norms are not deliberately created by unit leaders, old habits and ways of doing business will creep back into the organization and the change efforts will backslide to where they were before the change was initiated. Transformations due to the BRAC law help to ensure reinforcement takes place, as units do not have the option to go back to how they were previously operating. However, for

transformations that take place outside of congressional mandates, leaders need to ensure they continually reinforce the successes gained from the change, and work to build a new culture and norms supporting the new organization.

Kurt Lewin's change model of Unfreeze, Change, and Refreeze can also be applied to the information gained from the case studies; however, it is not as prescriptive as John Kotter's 8-step change model. In Chapter 3, Figure 6 illustrates the similarities between the Lewin and Kotter change models. Lewin's Unfreeze step encompasses Kotter's first four steps and pertains to the establishment of urgency, building the guiding coalition, developing the vision, and communicating for buy-in. The second step of Lewin connects with Kotter's fifth through seventh steps where leaders aim to empower action, create short-term wins, and drive the change hard without letting up. Lewin's third and final step pertains to Kotter's eighth step of making change stick. Although Lewin's model has the same effect as Kotter's model, Lewin's model is not as prescriptive and therefore is more difficult to use to educate leaders in the steps of change. Senior leaders can show transformation leaders the Kotter 8-step model and they immediately have an idea of what needs to be done and the order in which it needs to be accomplished.

Part of the confusion with change comes from the many levels at which change takes place within large organizations. Looking at the macro-level view of the Department of Defense, the BRAC decisions affect more than just one organization. It is difficult to determine which level should be responsible for implementing the eight-step change model. Obviously, there are too many details at the tactical level to implement change from the strategic level. Because of this, it is difficult to define at which level

there should be leadership oversight of the change effort. Within just the Air Force organization, there are the sub organizations of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserves, and the Air National Guard. Within each of these sub organizations there are further divisions between commands such as the Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and Air Force Material Command. With Active, Classic, and Reserve Associations, change efforts cross the larger sub organizations of the RegAF, AFRC, and ANG as well as the internal AF commands. This is why it is crucial that leaders implementing each association build a guiding team for that particular association ahead of the change effort to ensure they have time to build the vision before engaging the units in change.

The Air Force has determined the right level for oversight is at the Headquarters Air Force level, and has developed this oversight process in their A8 staff division. The AF/A8XF division is responsible for Total Force Enterprise (TFE) management. This office takes the lead for the TFE review process and Total Force Integration. They are the office of primary responsibility for AFRD 90-10, Total Force Integration Policy, and AFI 90-1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration. They also oversee the System Force Composition Analyses, which looks at the mix of Active Component and Reserve Component associations. This office also is responsible for leading the efforts to standardize TFI associations. As units continue to associate under the three types of associations, this shop takes feedback gained through after action reports and information gained from the AF Lessons Learned Information System, and implements changes into policy directives and Air Force Instructions.

Stepping through the change management models highlights another key piece studied in the field of organizational behavior. Dr. John Kotter's research highlights the differences between leaders and managers and he emphasizes that an organization must have both to succeed in business.¹⁰ Management is about a set of processes, such as planning, budgeting, organizing, staffing, controlling, and problem solving, designed to keep a complicated system of people and technology running smoothly.¹¹ Alternately, leadership is a set of processes that creates the organization in the first place, or adapts it to significantly changing circumstances.¹² Dr. Kotter explains that leaders define what the organization will look like in the future and aligns members of the organization to that vision, providing the inspiration to help them make it happen. Sometimes, leaders can be managers and managers can be leaders. However, more often, organizations will have inspirational leaders who are bad at the management processes or vice versa. The desire for a unitary change actor or over-arching guiding team highlighted in the case studies emphasizes the point that successful change efforts require both inspirational leaders and effective managers. Senior leaders implementing changes, whether from BRAC law or the results of internal reviews, must ensure the guiding team includes the functions of visionary leaders to create the end state, and managers to implement the changes.

Once organizations complete all of the steps of the change model they chose to use, leaders within the organization can start applying principles of organizational behavior to start building the new culture, identity and norms. Culture and norms play a large role in the day-to-day operations of an organization and have significant ties to

¹⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 57.

¹¹ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 25.

¹² Kotter, *Leading Change*, 25.

efficiency. An organization's culture represents the interdependent sets of values and behaviors influenced by a variety of social forces that are common to the organization, and tend to perpetuate themselves for long periods.¹³ Often invisible to those both inside and outside the organization, a common culture can enable organizations to take rapid coordinated action against a competitor or in support of a customer.¹⁴ This is because a common culture provides individual members with the same filters, biases, and ideas concerning how the organization operates. The sooner leaders can create the new culture after a major change such as an association takes place, the sooner units will start capitalizing on the inherent efficiencies of the new organization.

Overall, leaders are essential through all steps of change and are instrumental in building the new organization after transformation has occurred. Whether dealing with unclear guidance, a non-existent end state, or the lack of a guiding position, a strong leader using a change model to walk an organization through a major transformation will boost the organization's efficiency during and after the change process.

¹³ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 141.

¹⁴ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 8.

Chapter 6 –

Conclusions and Recommendations

Leadership must be educated in the knowledge of organizational behavior principles and models of change management to guide units efficiently through the transformation process as they merge through active, classic, or reserve associations. Of the many layers of organizations within the Air Force to include the Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserves, and the Air National Guard, the applicability of this paper falls mainly to the leadership at the operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, Air Force Policy Directive 90-10 directs the Headquarters Air Force A8 staff to provide management and oversight of the Total Force Integration movement on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force.¹ Although leadership at this level should be familiar with the principles, this level of leadership aims more at starting the transformation process than helping units work through it. The strategic level of leadership provides the necessary managerial oversight to ensure the right mix of units integrate under classic, active, and reserve associations, and guarantee that the Air Force can capitalize on the experience of the Guard and Reserve, yet still maintain the appropriate balance to provide combat capabilities. At the strategic level, HAF A/8 can provide the necessary guidance, standardization, and direction to start the sense of urgency to change without having to step each unit through the process. This is best done at the local unit level where leaders can directly influence the individuals involved with the change process.

The three major themes highlighted by the case studies in this paper deal with guidance, end-state vision, and an over-arching leadership position that can provide

¹ “AFPD 90-10,” 2.

standardization to the larger organization's change process. The strategic-level of leadership affects all levels by developing the necessary big-picture guidance, outlining the rough framework of the associated units, and providing the standardization across the strategic organization. However, it is the operational and tactical levels of leadership, which must communicate these three issues to the lower-level organizations, where the change will actually occur. For this reason, the focus of this paper is on the operational and tactical levels of leadership.

At the operational and tactical level, leaders need to be educated in the field of organizational behavior in order to affect organizational change in the most efficient manner. Implementing organization-wide education and training is difficult. In the short-term, senior leaders can ensure leaders of transformation have the right knowledge and ability by providing it prior to transformation taking place. This is critical, because at these levels, leaders begin to deal directly with the individuals presenting the behaviors that positively and negatively influence the organization's ability to change. Once unit selection occurs directing their association, HAF/A8 needs to identify the individuals that will implement the transformation and provide them the necessary training in Organizational Behavior and Change Management principles. This solves the current crisis of leaders not having the knowledge and ability to implement these massive change events in an efficient manner. Over the long-term, senior leaders should incorporate this education into appropriate levels of Professional Military Education. Although senior and unit leaders are ultimately responsible for the transformation, and their education in these principles is critical, leaders at all levels stand to gain benefits from knowing and

being able to implement Organizational Behavior principles. Future leaders should be targeted at the Field Grade level and above for education in Organizational Behavior.

Once units have been selected to associate, it is up to the operational leaders to implement it. The leaders from each unit must together create the guiding coalition that will drive the organization's transformation. The complexity of individual organizations aligned under the many sub-organizations of the Air Force requires leaders at the lowest levels to work through these integrations methodically. Once the leadership creates the guiding team with the right mix of position power, expertise, credibility, and leadership, the team can develop the crucial change vision that clarifies how the future will be different from the past.² The team must create a vision within the basic framework provided by strategic leadership that enables people to see where the organization is going. Effective visions include six key characteristics: imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable.³ Effective visions must convey to the masses what the future organization will look like, appeal to the long-term interests of its members, contain realistic and attainable goals, maintain a focus clear enough to support decision making, remain flexible to allow individual initiative and adaptation to conditions, and be easily communicated to the entirety of the organization.⁴ These actions provide the foundation with which the entire organizational transformation will rest upon. It is crucial that our operational and tactical leaders fully understand the importance of making this happen as well as have the required knowledge and ability to execute it.

² John Kotter, "Kotter's 8-Step Process For Leading Change," *Kotter International*, 2, accessed January 24, 2013, <http://www.kotterinternational.com/our-principles/changesteps/step-8>.

³ John Kotter, "Kotter's 8-Step Process For Leading Change," 3.

⁴ John Kotter, "Kotter's 8-Step Process For Leading Change," 3.

If executed properly, leaders educated and equipped with the knowledge and skills of organizational behavior and the processes of the change models, can effectively and efficiently lead organizations through transformation process. Managed change keeps organizations away from chaos, towards efficiency and away from failure.

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